2018-04-02T13:48:44+03:00

Сайт WikiLeaks: Американцы создают систему ПРО в Европе, чтобы ударить по русским?

Пожалуй, нет в последние годы в российско-американских отношениях более «острой занозы», чем споры вокруг системы противоракетной обороны, которую США вознамерились создать в Восточной Европе
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Официально она называется «третьим позиционным районом ПРО» (два других уже существуют на территории самих Штатов - в Калифорнии и на Аляске). Теперь же американские радары и ракеты-перехватчики придвинутся вплотную к российским границам. С чего бы это - ведь с Вашингтоном и НАТО мы давно вроде бы уже не враги? США Москву всячески успокаивают: мол, не волнуйтесь, система эта направлена вовсе не против России, а против зловредного Ирана и непредсказуемой Северной Кореи. Они втихую развивают ядерные программы, создают баллистические ракеты. А ну как шарахнут ими по странам НАТО - вот тогда мы эти их «подарочки» с помощью новой ПРО и перехватим. Но российских экспертов эти заверения не убеждают. Взгляд на карту показывает: под прицелом европейской ПРО будет находиться вся европейская часть нашей страны. И особенно те районы, из которых в случае необходимости должны стартовать российские межконтинентальные ракеты. А значит, создаваемая ПРО могла бы в какой-то мере нейтрализовать российские ядерные силы и обезопасить НАТО от ответного удара в случае западной агрессии. Вашингтон, наверное, и дальше бы отнекивался от таких сценариев, но тут на знаменитом компромат-сайте WikiLeaks появились секретные депеши американских посольств и миссии США в НАТО, не оставляющие сомнений в подлинных планах Америки. Некоторые из этих телеграмм, ранее не предававшихся гласности, оказались в распоряжении «КП». И сегодня у нас есть возможность познакомить с ними читателей. Российская угроза не исчезла Еще в 2003 году в НАТО была создана специальная экспертная группа для оценки угрозы, которую могут представить для блока баллистические ракеты «третьих стран». И вот в секретной депеше из миссии США при Североатлантическом альянсе под номером 05USNATO003 от 5 января 2005 г. делается вывод: «После 18 месяцев переговоров составлен подробный анализ угрозы баллистических ракет. Анализ показывает беспрецедентный консенсус относительно намерений и возможностей Ирана, Северной Кореи, Сирии, а также России и Китая». Применительно к нашей стране в депеше говорится: «Хотя Москва не собирается вести военные действия против НАТО, у России сохраняется развитый арсенал баллистических ракет, способных нанести ядерный удар по любой части НАТО. Россия также последовательно модернизирует свои баллистические ракеты и обновляет боеголовки... Нельзя исключить, что Россия может сделать что-либо вопреки договорам и остаться незамеченной. Россия развивает современные боевые системы, способные обойти защиту НАТО. Поэтому НАТО должна учитывать возможную угрозу России». Ни у Тегерана, ни у Пхеньяна подобных ракет тогда и в помине не было, как, кстати, нет их и теперь. Китай в этом плане пока что также обладает достаточно ограниченными возможностями. Ясно, что антиракетный «забор» на восточных границах сильно распухшего НАТО сколачивался против старого геополитического противника - России.

Секретные депеши американских дипломатов обнажили подлинные планы США.

Секретные депеши американских дипломатов обнажили подлинные планы США.

Америка готова к ядерной атаке Публично американцы продолжали это отрицать. Но тут вдруг у них вышла «промашка страшная»: о подлинных целях создаваемой в Европе системы ПРО проговорился ведущий журнал американской политической элиты «Форин афферс». В 2006 году в этом издании появилась статья под названием «Наступление американского ядерного превосходства». В ней без обиняков говорилось о том, что «США видят в России не партнера, но потенциального противника, а система ПРО может стать щитом, позволяющим США нанести первый ядерный удар». Понятно, что статья взволновала российское руководство. Тогдашний посол США в Москве Уильям Бернс шлет в госдепартамент экстренную телеграмму 06MOSCOW3333. Он пишет: «Эта статья срывает наши попытки убедить русских, что ПРО не направлена против безопасности России... поскольку она ясно отображает влиятельные позиции в руководстве США». В доказательство посол привел выдержки бесед американских дипломатов с различными российскими представителями. Влиятельный генерал Ивашов счел статью «политическим приемом оказания давления на Россию, предупреждением русским политикам». Думец Алексей Арбатов сказал, что публикация носит «полуофициальный характер» и что «попытка запугать (российское руководство. - Авт.) стремлением к ядерному превосходству может заставить Россию увеличить инвестиции в свой ядерный арсенал». Да что там! Даже сверхлиберальный Егор Гайдар признал, что «статья имела сокрушительный эффект», и посетовал, что она «может привести Россию и Китай к сотрудничеству в области ядерных технологий». Прошло три года. И все это время Вашингтон продолжал заверять нас, что радары в Чехии и противоракеты в Польше устанавливаются на случай ракетной атаки со стороны коварного Ирана. Ну а посольство США в Москве продолжало называть вещи своими именами. В апреле 2009 года в депеше 09MOSCOW1016 откровенно и даже образно говорится: «ПРО предназначена для успокоения новых союзников США в Восточной Европе; американские сапоги на их земле послужат сдерживающим фактором против России - страны, которой США не вполне доверяют». Где же «иранский фактор»? Американцы прекрасно знали об озабоченностях Москвы. Например, в том же апреле 2009 г. в посольской депеше 09MOSCOW1111 под грифами «Секретно» и «Не для иностранцев» приводятся слова министра иностранных дел РФ Сергея Лаврова, сказавшего американцам, что Россию не устраивает установка радара, которая сможет следить за всей территорией страны, вплоть до Урала. Гриф «Не для иностранцев» вполне уместен. Потому что в то же самое время американские дипломаты уламывали политиков в Польше и Чехии, заставляя их публично признать некие угрозы их странам извне, чтобы разместить элементы системы ПРО. Посол США в Праге сообщил в телеграмме 06PRAGUE000360: «Чехия может оказаться хорошим кандидатом для размещения ПРО-перехватчиков или ПРО-радара, но внутренняя политика требует осторожного обращения». В беседе с послом член парламентского комитета по обороне Радим Турек искренне сказал, что «население Чехии не верит в ракетную угрозу и обещания упрочения безопасности на них не повлияют». В Польше переговоры шли по немного другому сценарию. Поляки хотели получить все даром. Вот депеша 08WARSAW314, посланная в 2008 году помощником госсекретаря Стивеном Маллом. Варшава просила батареи ПРО «Патриот» третьего поколения, но Малл сказал: «Мы готовы обсудить продажу батарей, если вы готовы их купить». Депеша отмечает, что этот ответ очень огорчил поляков. А дальше самое интересное: «Польский представитель признал, что Польше не угрожает «немедленная опасность», но жаловался на «дефицит демократии» в России, что может привести к возникновению «враждебного соседа» в ближайшем будущем». Этот пассаж лишний раз подтверждает: США и НАТО создают систему ПРО, направленную против России, а не Ирана, о котором поляки даже не упоминают.

Вот такие ракеты Patriot американцы собираются разместить в Восточной Европе.

Вот такие ракеты Patriot американцы собираются разместить в Восточной Европе.

Кольцо сжимается Какой там Иран! Благодаря WikiLeaks стало известно, что Вашингтон одновременно вел переговоры с государствами, расположенными совсем в других частях света, о создании в них американской противоракетной обороны. Государства разные, но выстроены цепью вокруг России. Вот телеграмма 2007 года из посольства США в Японии 07TOKYO1211 с грифом «Конфиденциально». «Япония готова к размещению у себя ПРО и стремится, чтобы этот план осуществился быстрее». Но за это согласие Токио требует от американцев ответной услуги - сделать Японию шестым постоянным членом Совета Безопасности ООН. Но, видимо, тогда переговоры далеко не продвинулись. Вашингтон забрасывал сети и в Индию. Телеграмма из посольства США в Дели 07NEW DELHI4767: «Индия поддерживает американский концепт ПРО, но не соглашается перейти от дискуссии к обязательствам. К тому же она хочет использовать собственные противоракеты, а не размещать американские». Обойти «упрямых русских»! Осенью 2009 года президент Обама заявил, что временно «кладет на полку» планы по развертыванию ПРО в Европе. Мол, слишком она дорогая. Хотя в конфиденциальных беседах с поляками и чехами американские дипломаты признавались, что «неуступчивость русских» свою роль сыграла. Это решение «заметно ударило по позициям атлантистов в Чехии и Польше», говорится в сообщении 09USNATO403 представителя США при НАТО Айво Даалдера. Но уже в 2010 году маятник ПРО вновь качнулся в другую сторону. Речь уже пошла об установке радаров и ракет в Румынии и Болгарии. Решение США разместить элементы ПРО в Румынии было встречено российским руководством с возмущением, сообщает американский посол из Москвы в секретной депеше 10MOSCOW319. Он передает разговор с председателем Комитета Госдумы по международным делам Константином Косачевым. «Эти планы (об установке ракет в Румынии. - Авт.) показывают недобросовестность США, так как раньше Америка обещала консультироваться с Россией до принятия решения о размещении ПРО». И, наконец, в январе 2010 года в суперсекретной депеше 10USNATO4 посол США в НАТО Даалдер рассказывает о визите в Москву генсека НАТО Расмуссена. Причем о тех деталях, которые сам генсек в свой отчет не включил. Американцам же они стали известны благодаря их осведомителю в аппарате Расмуссена. Так вот этот источник сообщил, что «Путин ошарашил генерального секретаря обвинениями по поводу планов НАТО разместить ракеты в Болгарии и потребовал дальнейшей информации об этом... Путин сказал Расмуссену, что НАТО больше не является целью (имеется в виду - противником. - Авт.)». А раз так, нет смысла просвечивать натовскими радарами российскую территорию. В этих словах российского премьера содержался и ответ на американские надежды, что передача ПРО под контроль НАТО смягчит противодействие Москвы попыткам ужать ее стратегическое пространство. ВМЕСТО ПОСЛЕСЛОВИЯ Никто не знает, как будут развиваться мировые события в последующие десятилетия. Но один из сценариев, похоже, становится все более реальным: резкая конкуренция держав за доступ к сырьевым ресурсам, источникам пресной воды, пахотным землям и лесным угодьям. Всего этого - в избытке в нынешней России. А если прогнозы на глобальное потепление окажутся верными, то наша страна окажется в весьма благоприятной зоне с точки зрения ведения эффективного сельского хозяйства. Это - лакомый кусок для многих наших соседей по планете. Как бы это пафосно ни звучало, но планы создания ПРО у рубежей России (сначала в Европе, а потом, глядишь, и в других местах) могут привести к тому, что нам банально выкрутят руки и заставят своими богатствами «щедро поделиться». Ведь в военном плане российские возможности защитить себя сильно сократятся. Кто-то скажет, что с Западом мы не враги и воевать с нами он не собирается. Сейчас - да, и хотелось бы, чтобы так было всегда. Но национальные интересы стран со временем меняются. А вот чужой военный потенциал, зачем-то создаваемый у наших границ, останется. Не стоит об этом забывать...

ПОДЛИННИКИ ТЕКСТОВ ДЕПЕШ НА АНГЛИЙСКОМ ЯЗЫКЕ

05.01.2005: NATO MOVES FORWARD WITH LANDMARK BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT ASSESSMENT S E C R E T USNATO 000003 STATE FOR EUR/PRA, EUR/RPM, NP/PPC, AC/DS OSD/ISP FOR SCHLESS, ROSE OSD/MDA FOR KIEFER, SEARSE NSC FOR VOLKER, DICASAGRANDE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2014 TAGS: NATO, KNNP, PARM, MNUC REF: C-M(2004)109 Classified By: Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 1. (S) Summary: During the December 9 Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Foreign Ministers noted the completion of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile Risks and Threats. The fruit of more than 18 months of negotiations, the Analysis fulfills in part a 2002 Prague Summit tasking to examine options for addressing ballistic missile threats to the Alliance. At 180 pages, it provides the most comprehensive assessment of WMD and ballistic missile (BM) proliferation trends the Alliance has ever produced. Among the documents key findings are that some countries currently have the capability to launch a ballistic missile attack on NATOs southeastern flank and U.S. forces in the Pacific, and that the risk of a ballistic missile attack on any Alliance territory, population centers or NATO forces, while moderate, will remain a concern in the decade to come. The Analysis contains unprecedented consensus positions on the intentions, capabilities and proliferation record of Iran, Syria and North Korea as well as Russia and China. It also addresses the contributions of non-proliferation instruments, including new approaches such

as PSI and UNSCR 1540, as well as the implications of the

A.Q. Khan network.

2. (C) Combined with two major feasibility studies and ongoing technical consultations, the Analysis provides NATO with the political consensus and general assessment necessary to move forward with Alliance deliberations on the acquisition and fielding of defense capabilities against the full range of ballistic missile threats. In this context, USNATO fully appreciates the Intelligence Communitys strong support for the Analysiss development, will continue to request relevant U.S. intelligence releasable to NATO, and welcomes high-level and expert USG officials available to brief Allies in the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on WMD and BM proliferation-related topics. End Summary. Context of the Longer-Term Analysis -----------------------------------

3. (U) While NATO has yet to make a definitive decision on missile defense for populations and territories, NATOs Strategic Concept notes that NATOs posture against the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery "must continue to improve, including through work on missile defense." At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government agreed "to examine options for addressing the increasing missile threat to NATO territory, forces and population centers in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defense efforts, along with deterrence" as well as to initiate a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Feasibility Study.

4. (C) This TMD feasibility study, which focuses on the technical requirements, costs, and time scale of possible architectures for an Active-Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) system to protect NATO deployed forces, was completed in 2003. In January 2004, a second Missile Defense Feasibility Study was contracted to examine options for protecting Alliance territory and population centers. Upon its scheduled completion in July 2005, this study will be submitted to the Conference of National Armaments Directors, which will review and approve a consolidated report in late 2005. This report in turn will be forwarded to the Executive Working Group (Reinforced) (EWG(R)), NATOs primary forum for missile defense consultations.

5. (C) During the December 9 Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Foreign Ministers noted the completion of the Longer-Term Analysis of Ballistic Missile Risks and Threats (reftel), which fulfilled another 2002 Prague Summit tasking to assess current and potential WMD and ballistic missile threats to the Alliance over the next ten years. The fruit of more than 18 months of negotiations, this 180-page Analysis contains unprecedented consensus positions on key countries of proliferation concern and provides the most comprehensive assessment of WMD and BM risks and threats the Alliance has ever produced.

6. (S) The Analysis is divided into five chapters, which address non-proliferation regimes and national measures; capabilities and intentions; alternative means of delivery; secondary proliferation and procurement networks; and intelligence gaps. As a whole, it clearly demonstrates that NATO already faces certain risks and potential threats, and that the Alliance must continue to closely monitor the intentions and capabilities of countries of proliferation concern.

7. (C) Combined with the EWG(R)s ongoing work and the two Missile Defense Feasibility Studies, the Analysis provides NATO with the political consensus and general assessment necessary to move forward with Alliance deliberations on the acquisition and fielding of defense capabilities against ballistic missile threats. This includes the goal of achieving initial operational capability for an ALTBMD system to protect NATO deployed forces by 2010 as well as possible steps toward acquiring capabilities to protect Alliance territory and population centers against the full range of BM threats. Key Findings of the Longer-Term Analysis ----------------------------------------

8. (S) The risk of a ballistic missile attack on any Alliance territory, population centers, or NATO deployed forces, while moderate, will remain a concern in the decade to come. Iran and Syria have ballistic missiles that can reach parts of NATO territory and deployed forces, and they have chemical weapons (CW) for use as warheads. Concerns over Russian and Chinese BM capabilities are currently primarily limited to the potential for accidental or unauthorized launches, and the risk that their technology will proliferate to unstable countries.

9. (S) Current and future assessments of BM capabilities must take into account scenarios where components indigenously developed or acquired from abroad are integrated into existing missile programs to improve accuracy and operational readiness. Countries developing BMs may not necessarily follow U.S. or Russian patterns of development or deployment. North Korea began fielding and selling the No Dong after a single flight test, and countries today may rely in part on computer modeling or other means aside from easily observable test launches to keep their development programs covert.

10. (S) Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are not widely recognized as an immediate threat to the Alliance, but an indirect risk to NATO deployed forces is possible. In the future, there will be an increased risk that UAVs could be converted to carry and dispense CW and biological weapons (BW). The willingness of some states and illegal entities to transfer UAV or cruise missile (CM) components, peripheral equipment or technology is increasing and requires effective counter-proliferation measures to reduce their availability. There is currently no disarmament or non-proliferation agreement that restrains the production, development or possession of UAVs and CMs.

11. (S) Possession of WMD and their means of delivery has become a major goal for both state and non-state actors for reasons of prestige, influence or deterrence. Proliferating states and entities are employing increasingly sophisticated measures to obtain WMD- or BM-related equipment, materials and technologies. Some countries that were proliferation customers in the 1980s have themselves become suppliers. The development of indigenous capabilities in relevant dual-use applications such as nuclear power, biotechnology and space launch systems can help to conceal ultimate intentions. North Korea and Iran as well as Russian and Chinese entities are likely to remain the major suppliers of WMD- and BM-related equipment, materials and expertise. The identification, monitoring, and eventual dismantlement of the A.Q. Khan network show that there is a complicated worldwide marketplace for these inputs.

12. (C) Although arms control agreements and non-proliferation regimes will continue to slow the proliferation of WMD and BMs, the capability of both suppliers and proliferants are likely to improve. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is the strongest affirmation of the international communitys support for multilateral treaties and other international instruments that seek to prevent WMD proliferation. Traditional diplomatic measures are enhanced by new tools such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and Operation Active Endeavour, which serve to complement and strengthen international norms and mechanisms. Select Country-Specific Conclusions -----------------------------------

North Korea:

13. (S) Recent developments in North Korea seem to indicate ambitions to use WMD combined with BMs not only as a deterrent but also as a political bargaining chip and a means of blackmail to obtain economic or financial aid. Various sources place North Korea has having 10 to 30 kg of weapons-grade plutonium, and while North Korea claims to have a nuclear deterrent, there is uncertainty as to whether it currently has operational nuclear weapons for military use. It is possible that North Korea would use WMD and BMs if it felt that the survival of the regime was at stake.

14. (S) Pyongyang is reportedly developing a new land-mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) derived from the Soviet SS-N-6 submarine-launched BM; if confirmed, this potential to use a more advanced propulsion technology would be of serious concern. North Korea has continued with development work and ground-based testing of the Taepo Dong-2, which according to some Allies experts with a third stage could deliver a weapons payload of 500 kg up to 15,000 km--i.e., all of the United States and Europe, albeit with very poor accuracy. U.S. forces in the Pacific are within range of North Korean missiles, and it is cause for serious concern that North Koreas willingness to proliferate longer-range BM technology will hasten the risk to broad expanses of NATO territory.

Iran:

15. (S) Iran continues to put a high priority on an ambitious BM program focused on the development of both liquid and solid propellant short-range BMs and medium-range BMs with assistance from Russia, North Korea and China. Tehran has announced its intention to put satellites into orbit, which would establish the technical base to develop an IRBM or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. Iran already has BM capabilities that put the southeastern flank of NATO within range, and within the next ten years, it is likely to produce qualitative and quantitative changes to its military capabilities that will significantly increase the potential threat to the Alliance and NATO forces deployed in the region.

16. (S) Concerns have been widely expressed over Irans nuclear program and its failures and breaches regarding its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the IAEA cannot positively identify that Irans nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes. Should its nuclear program continue to proceed at the same pace, Iran could produce sufficient fissile material for a first nuclear device by 2010. Iran is assessed to have an offensive BW program and has almost certainly conducted BW-related research using spray devices and adapted munitions for delivery. Despite its ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Iran is also assessed to be retaining an offensive CW program and has the technological capability to develop a CW warhead for use on BMs.

Syria:

17. (S) There is no evidence that Syria plans to attempt to acquire or develop a nuclear weapons capability, and it currently lacks the resources, infrastructure and scientific expertise to pursue one. Syria is judged to have a BW program in the research and development phase, as well as an advanced CW program that includes several facilities for testing, production and storage of CW. Syria can produce SCUD missile fuel and various solid propellant ingredients, and continues to make progress in this area with probable Chinese and Iranian assistance. It can deliver both sarin and VX with aerial bombs, SCUD-Bs and possibly SCUD-Cs. Qualitative and quantitative improvements in Syrias WMD and BM capabilities over the next ten years will increase the potential threat to NATO territory, notably the southeastern flank of the Alliance.

China:

18. (S) China has a mature capability to develop and launch BMs with nuclear warheads and is carrying out a strategic modernization program to improve the quality of its arsenal, including replacing liquid-fueled ICBMs with solid-fuel systems and deploying more of its BMs on road-mobile launchers. China is believed to have an advanced CW program as well as an offensive BW capability, and its voluntary declarations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention are believed to be inaccurate and incomplete. While China has the capability to pose a potential threat to NATO territory or deployed forces, at present Beijing focuses on a strategic posture that defends its regional influence in Asia. The greatest concern regarding Chinese capabilities is the risk of onward proliferation of technology and material to other countries. In light of all these elements, NATO must remain aware of developments in China.

Russia:

19. (S) While Moscow has no intention of executing military operations against the Alliance, Russia has a mature arsenal of BMs capable of delivering nuclear weapons to any part of NATO territory. It is also modernizing its BMs at a measured pace and is pursuing warhead refurbishment. While the Cooperative Threat Reduction program will continue to improve the security of non-deployed nuclear warheads, weapons-grade fissile material will likely remain vulnerable to theft. Russias BW program, which is probably still offensive, remains active and declarations to date have failed to reveal the full size and scope of the Soviet program. Russia possesses a number of unacknowledged CW agents and weapons, and it cannot be entirely excluded that Russia could pursue some non-compliant activity without detection. It has given priority to the development of modern CW systems and agents designed to defeat NATO protective systems and circumvent the CWC. In light of its WMD and BM capabilities, NATO must remain concerned about the potential threat from Russia. Small Step for NATO MD, Giant Leap for SGP ------------------------------------------

20. (S) Comment: While the Longer-Term Analysis is but one of many inputs into the equation that will determine how NATO will face the spread of WMD and BM capabilities, it has also succeeded in highlighting proliferation issues of key importance to the U.S. Spirited and sometimes contentious debate with Allies (especially France and Germany) over Iran, North Korea, and China in the SGP has in the end produced a broad and agreed foundation for continued engagement with Allies on tough proliferation questions. In this context, USNATO fully appreciates the Intelligence Communitys strong support for the Analysiss development, will continue to request relevant U.S. intelligence releasable to NATO, and welcomes high-level and expert USG officials available to brief Allies in the SGP and the NAC on WMD and BM proliferation-related topics. While such briefings--and the debates they provoke--may seem to parallel discussion in other fora, it is essential that we raise these issues at NATO Headquarters if the U.S. is to play a leadership role in shaping Alliance policy, guiding the development of collective capabilities, and considering operational responses to curb and counter the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. End Comment. BURNS C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000319 SIPDIS GENEVA FOR JCIC, DEPT FOR VCI/SI E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020 TAGS: PARM, PREL, MCAP, RO, RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN REACTION TO ROMANIAN SM-3 MISSILE DEFENSE: WE'RE NOT ALARMED, BUT WE STILL DON'T BELIEVE YOU Classified By: DCM Eric Rubin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: Official Russia remained calm in the face of the Romanian announcement that U.S. SM-3 missile defense interceptors would be deployed there. Although there were echoes of Putin's late December complaints that the U.S. missile defense program threatened a START follow-on, government statements were mostly limited to requests for further details. Experts and officials noted possible issues raised by the Montreux Convention and the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and there remains considerable reluctance to accept U.S. assurances that the deployment is meant only for countering an Iranian threat. End summary. 2. (SBU) Discounting the off-message blast from CHOD General Nikolay Makarov, who claimed U.S. missile defense plans were preventing completion of the START follow-on treaty, official reaction to the announcement by the Romanian government of its agreement with the U.S. to deploy SM-3 ballistic missile defense systems has been moderate. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov raised a possible complication for Black Sea region MD deployment, observing that Romania is a signatory to the Montreux Convention, which limits the number and size of warships operating in the Black Sea. Lavrov asked for a "comprehensive answer" to the question of the convention's impact. He also noted that the U.S. and Russia agreed to undertake a joint analysis of ballistic missile threats, and called for wider participation by European countries, particularly Germany. 3. (SBU) Russian ambassador to NATO Dmitriy Rogozin denied the Romania basing plans would have any impact on the successful completion of the START follow-on negotiations, but he added that Russia expects the U.S. to provide technical data on the interceptors planned for Romania in order to ensure that they do not threaten Russia's offensive strategic weapons. Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov told the Munich Security Conference that Russia will demand detailed explanations from the U.S. of its MD basing plans in Romania, claiming that details of capabilities and infrastructure are still lacking. Ivanov complained that it was difficult for Russia to implement reductions in its nuclear forces when the U.S. was actively pursuing strategic missile defenses. 4. (SBU) Chair of the Duma international affairs committee Konstantin Kosachev insisted that the Romanian basing demonstrated again the inseparability of strategic offensive and defensive systems. He complained that the Romanian announcement demonstrated a lack of good faith by the U.S. as it had earlier agreed to consult with Russia on future MD deployments. He chided the U.S. for giving in to the "petty ambitions" of Bucharest after reconsidering the previous administration's plans for interceptors in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic. 5. (SBU) While expert opinion outside the government was on balance not very critical, several commentators noted the apparent lack of consultation with Moscow and the SM-3's potential for threatening Russian ICBMs after further improvements. U.S. and Canada Institute director Sergey Rogov also noted a possible connection between a Romanian MD deployment and the 1997 commitments of the U.S. and Russia, in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, to refrain from basing "substantial military forces" on the territories of the new NATO members. Retired Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, former head of a strategic weapons research institute, said the Romanian announcement illustrated the need for full cooperation among the U.S., Europe, and Russia in the construction of a joint missile defense system. 6. (C) COMMENT: News of the Romanian MD agreement came as Russia unveiled its new military doctrine, which identified NATO enlargement and missile defense as threats to Russia's security. While the GOR is still developing a detailed response to the U.S. offer of extensive cooperation on missile defense, the technical potential of the SM-3 and the radars planned for phase 1 of the Phased Adaptive Array, which Russians claim can reach their western missile fields, appear to many here to justify the threat assessment contained in the new doctrine. Regardless of the technical MOSCOW 00000319 002 OF 002 facts, many Russians, in and out of government, will continue to dismiss U.S. claims that PAA is meant only to counter the threat from Iran. The negative GOR reaction also stems from the timing of the announcement -- during the home-stretch of START negotiations, which have been bedeviled throughout by MD issues. End comment. Beyrle C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003333 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2016 TAGS: PREL, PARM, MNUC, PGOV, RS SUBJECT: U.S. NUCLEAR PRIMACY ARTICLE HITS A NERVE Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns per 1.4 (b/d). 1. (C) Summary: A Foreign Affairs article asserting the advent of U.S. nuclear primacy has caused a stir in the Russian political elite and media and forced Russian leaders to defend the viability of Russia's deterrent force. The thesis plays to the belief that the U.S. regards Russia as a potential enemy, not a partner, and that a U.S. BMD capability could serve as a shield enabling an American first strike. We will continue to look for opportunities, including upcoming visits by high-ranking U.S. officials, to take on these misperceptions. End Summary. Defending Russia's Strategic Nuclear Potential --------------------------------------------- - 2. (C) The "Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," an article by academics at Notre Dame and the University of Pennsylvania that appears in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, has created a stir in the Russia political elite and media and touched a nerve in the Russian defense establishment. Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin raised the article in a March 28 meeting with Ambassador, as did Kremlin Foreign Policy Advisor Prikhodko on March 30. Ambassador responded that the article reflected the views of its authors, not the U.S. government, and said it badly misrepresented U.S. policy. 3. (SBU) Media interest has compelled senior officials to go on record defending the capacity of Russia's nuclear deterrent. Defmin Sergey Ivanov has commented that the article shows that some in the U.S. "must dislike the fact that we have established good relations with China." Underlining that Russia maintains "powerful and effective nuclear forces," Ivanov said the article was "not serious" and compared it to accusations that Russia had provided intelligence to Saddam Hussein. 4. (SBU) Colonel General Nikolai Solovstov, Commander of Russia's strategic rocket forces, focused on the article's assertion that BMD technology could give the U.S. a shield for a first strike. He stated in an interview: "We have always managed to find resources for preserving and renewing our strategic nuclear potential. Current technologies make it possible to develop new missiles and other weapons for outsmarting even the most effective ABM system." Vladimir Dvorkin, a former MOD official now at an Academy of Sciences institute, told the press that the Foreign Affairs article "exaggerated" the incapacity of Russia to ensure continuing nuclear deterrence, but confirmed that the general degradation of Russian capabilities described in the article was closer to the mark. Former MOD liaison office head Leonid Ivashov described the article as "a political means of putting pressure on Russia, a warning to Russian politicians." Dismay ------ 5. (C) Aleksey Arbatov, a former Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairman, raised the article in a March 28 meeting with us. He acknowledged that the authors were not well-known, but said the article's publication in Foreign Affairs nonetheless gave it the aura of a "semi-official statement." Arbatov, who chairs an advisory group on strategic issues at the Security Council, told us officials there were dismayed. He said some in the Kremlin saw the article as part of a series of salvos aimed at Russia and pointed to "demeaning" references to Russia in the U.S. National Security Strategy, the accusation that Russia passed military information to Saddam, and the lack of U.S. recognition for Russia's prerogatives in its neighborhood. 6. (C) Arbatov added that the idea that the U.S. might seek to use nuclear blackmail against Russia resonates strongly in Moscow, especially in the MOD, and an attempt to intimidate Russia through efforts to develop nuclear primacy would spur Russia to be invest more in its own nuclear arsenal. Arbatov said the Foreign Affairs article would be the prime subject at a Conference at which he will speak at the Carnegie Moscow Center April 4. 7. (SBU) Former Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar also joined the chorus of lamentation in the March 29 Financial Times, noting that the Foreign Affairs article had had "an explosive effect...Even Russian journalists and analysts not inclined to hysteria or anti-Americanism have viewed the article as an expression of the U.S. official stance." Gaydar argued that "if someone had wanted to provoke Russia and China into close cooperation over missile and nuclear technologies, it would have been difficult to find a more skillful and elegant way MOSCOW 00003333 002 OF 002 of doing so." Comment ------- 8. (C) The article's forecast of U.S. nuclear primacy plays to deep-seated Russian fears and undermines efforts to build confidence that our BMD efforts do not come at the expense of Russian security. While official and expert Russians recognize that the article does not formally represent the views of the U.S. government, there is wide suspicion that its appearance in a prestigious journal, especially in the context of other recent strains in our relationship, may nonetheless have had some official sponsorship, or at least accurately reflect influential views within our government. High-ranking U.S. officials who will be visiting Russia in the near future (including STRATCOM's General Cartwright, ISN Assistant Secretary Rademaker, and U/S Burns) should expect questions from Russian interlocutors and the media for clarification of whether the U.S. is seeking, or at least expecting, to be in a position of nuclear primacy vis-a-vis Russia in coming years. BURNS C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 000314 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR PM, EUR AND ISN SECDEF FOR DASD FATA EUCOM FOR EC-J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018 TAGS: PREL, MCAP, MARR, PL, RS SUBJECT: MISSILE DEFENSE AND POLISH MILITARY MODERNIZATION TALKS Classified By: Charge d'affaires Mary T. Curtin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: A State-DOD delegation led by PM Acting Assistant Secretary Stephen Mull met with Polish counterparts February 29, in Warsaw to propose a way forward on U.S.-Polish collaboration in support of Poland,s defense modernization as related to U.S.-Polish Missile Defense negotiations. The Poles seemed disappointed that USG could not promise a gift of PAC-IIIs, and they were reluctant to express interest in buying them. Nevertheless, while Polish negotiators need to consult with their political leadership before formally responding, they welcomed our proposals for 7 bilateral working groups and a defense-needs requirements study as a constructive way forward. They saw no obstacle to proceeding with Acting U/S John Rood,s visit on March 6. The Poles doubted that the two sides could finalize the draft Declaration on Strategic Cooperation before PM Tusk's visit to Washington March 10, however they said that the PM was ready to make a statement in support of the draft and asked if the President might do the same. End Summary. ---------------- U.S. Perspective ---------------- 2. (C) AA/S Mull opened with a statement to define the context and goals of the Security Cooperation Consultation Group (SCCG). He declared that Poland belongs to an "exclusive group" of allies including Israel, Japan, South Korea and the UK. He recalled that over the past 15 years the U.S. has transferred over $400 million in military assistance to Poland which ranks first in Europe and 6th worldwide for receipt of Foreign Military Finance (FMF) money. However, these huge dollar amounts do not mean that our relationship is based only on transactions: it is in fact based on shared strategic interests. AA/S Mull stressed the importance that the USG placed on all aspects of the relationship, including those that had been ignored in recent years. His delegation provided a clear sign of the USG,s commitment to all aspects of the bilateral relationship with Poland and our support for Polish defense modernization. 3. (C) Given our shared strategic interests, AA/S Mull declared that, "We want to propose a way forward to study baseline needs." Working groups would function with due regard for the NATO context and cover: air defense, C4ISR, defense trade, mobility, and financing. They would offer recommendations within six months. Ultimately, this process would require significant Polish investment. In reference to Poland,s oft-stated desire for a legally binding commitment of some sort, AA/S Mull noted that any signed, binding document on defense cooperation would be difficult to conclude in the current political climate and that more formality would actually yield less commitment. ------------------ Annex I Assessment ------------------ 4. (C) After emphasizing that our strong bilateral relationship enabled honest communication, AA/S Mull stated that the needs described in Annex I did not seem to be linked to realistic threats. He continued that Annex I did not appear to give adequate consideration to the impact of an armaments program on the region. Poland,s expression of interest in the MEADS air defense program seemed focused on the past and would require multilateral approval. AA/S Mull also clarified that we do not have Patriots available right now. He added that production timelines along with start-up costs would increase prices and push final delivery years into the future. He asked that we discuss cheaper alternatives. That said, AA/S Mull underscored that, "We are ready to discuss selling Patriots if you are ready to buy them." ---------------------- The Polish Perspective ---------------------- 5. (C) Poland's lead negotiator, MFA U/S Witold Waszczykowski, thanked A/AS Mull for his candid assessment of Annex I and solicited more input from the U.S. side on what was realistic. Waszczykowski began his own presentation with a concise statement of Poland's top priority, "In our view, the Declaration on Strategic Cooperation is most important, it is where the other lanes of cooperation: BMD, SOFA, and military modernization start." He added that the U.S. non-paper presented by AA/S Mull was a "good start" for further discussion. As usual in MD-related talks with Poland, Polish remarks quickly turned to hardware transfers. Waszczykowski noted that Poland hoped the term "transfer" was not limited to "sale"; he called for "other possibilities." Piotr Pacholski, Head of MoD's Missile Defense Office, supported this call for creative financing and even went so far as to refute the PAC-III cost estimates provided by DOD's J-5 representative. While the J-5 rough order of magnitude (ROM) cost estimate indicated that Poland's Annex I request for three PAC-III battalions could cost from 9-12 billion USD, Pacholski said that his own research based on open source material put the cost at 6-7 billion USD. On the need for PAC-IIIs, Waszczykowski admitted that Poland did not face an "immediate threat" but saw a deepening "deficit of democracy" in Russia which "could yield a hostile neighbor in the near future." ---------------- Defense Equities ---------------- 6. (C) The U.S. delegation reaffirmed that we want a strategic relationship with Poland and intend to make a long-term commitment to assisting Poland with modernizing its armed forces. DOD delegation head DASD Dan Fata made the point that there needs to be a sustained conversation between both parties to reach a common understanding on the threats Poland faces, the capabilities Poland currently possesses to defend against these threats, and the various solutions available to address these threats. Fata made the point that emphasis and effort should be focused on seeing how the U.S. can assist Poland in addressing its short-term air defense and other force modernization needs while at the same time beginning a conversation about Poland's medium- and long-term defense needs, including Patriot systems. DASD Fata also noted that there needs to be further discussion with the Poles about what the Patriot system is and is not, production timeline schedules, costs, and how the Polish defense ministry will go about incorporating the high operations and maintenance, integration, and sustainment costs of a Patriot (and other modern defense systems) into the Polish defense budget. -------------------------------------- U.S. Offer: Working Groups, Assessment Study -------------------------------------- 7. (C) U/S Waszczykowski asked how we might reconcile the proposed timelines with what he understood to be the agreement between FM Sikorski and Secretary Rice to parallel, synchronous progress on the two separate tracks: BMD basing and security cooperation. AA/S Mull underscored our sincere interest in helping Poland to modernize but stressed that such military modernization would require a significant Polish government investment of time and resources. 8.(C) AA/S Mull emphasized the USG,s strong commitment to a collaborative process to support Poland,s defense modernization goals. He made clear that Poland,s goals in Annex I were not realistic given threat analyses and resources and suggested the U.S. and Poland work together to identify Poland,s priority defense requirements. A/AS Mull proposed establishing seven joint U.S.-Polish working groups to focus on: Defense Modernization, including separate groups on air defense (including prospects for PAC-III transfers), ground force needs, C4ISR, and logistics; Intelligence Analysis (to define and refine analysis of security threats to Poland and to factor that into Poland,s defense planning process); Financial Options; and Defense Trade (to resolve defense trade licensing issues). 9. (C) The U.S. delegation also offered to conduct an independent baseline study, to be finished in 6 months, to assess Poland,s defense needs and report to the Defense Modernization working group which would define the study,s terms of reference and recommend appropriate follow-up following its completion. The U.S. team offered to seek funding for this study. In response to Polish concern over the lack of general contingency planning in NATO or the U.S. over possible threats to Polish security, AA/S Mull offered to explore organizing tabletop crisis response exercises with the Poles. AA/S Mull emphasized the USG,s strong commitment to a collaborative process to support Poland,s defense modernization goals. --------------- The Way Forward --------------- 10. (C) Waszczykowski and Deputy Minister of Defense Komorowski responded positively to AA/S Mull's proposals, but noted that they had to consult this with the Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers before the Government of Poland could offer an official response. Waszczykowski indicated that Acting U/S Rood's proposed visit on March 6 to proceed with BMD negotiations should go forward as planned. The Deputy Foreign Minister also underscored Poland's interest in a concrete deliverable for PM Tusk,s visit to Washington. On the margins, Poland's lead negotiator, Witold Waszczykowski noted that he thinks it unlikely we will come to agreement on the Missile Defense track or the draft Declaration on Strategic Cooperation before PM Tusk's visit to Washington March 10. He said it would help move the process forward for the President to publicly endorse the spirit of the draft Declaration on Strategic Cooperation and our commitment to work on defense modernization during PM Tusk,s visit to Washington. Both sides agreed that pursuing the defense assessment and establishment of the working groups is a priority in order to meet the proposed six-month deadline. AA/S Mull promised Waszczykowski that it would take approximately a month to identify a contractor for a defense assessment. In the meantime, State and DoD will propose U.S. leads for the working group so that they are ready to meet as soon as possible. --------------- Press Statement --------------- 11. (U) After the negotiations, Ambassador Mull issued the following press statement. I was very pleased to be in Warsaw today to discuss with Minister Waszczykowski and our other Polish friends the prospects for strengthening the Polish-American partnership in support of Poland's military modernization. America greatly values its bilateral security relationship with Poland and our broader alliance within NATO. Together over the past decade, we have worked closely and effectively to expand the zone of peace and cooperation in Europe; to promote the growth of democratic values in the broader European neighborhood; and, more recently, to protect our North Atlantic community from the grave threat of terror emanating from Afghanistan. As a result, Poland and America are safer. But our work is not yet complete. It is very much in America's interests that Poland continue its contributions to efforts on behalf of global security, and to defend itself against new threats that arise. Our guarantee through NATO of Poland's security is an important element of our support for Poland. We have also been pleased to support Poland's military modernization with more than $400 million in security assistance over the past 15 years. My colleagues and I came to Poland today to chart the future of our continuing support for the modernization of Poland's defense forces. We agreed to focus in particular on Poland's air defense, command and control and mobility needs. While we have much work to do on both sides to clarify the details of how we can work together on these issues, we made a good start today. We want to continue this work. In the final analysis, I assure you that Poland will be able to count on America's continuing strong and substantial support for years to come as it improves its capabilities to defend against our common threats. 12. (U) Polish media focused on the military modernization part of AA/S Mull,s press statement. The influential daily "Dziennik" reported that, "The Americans have promised to determine in what way they can support modernization of the Polish armed forces. It concerns mostly air defense and command systems. These negotiations will be conducted simultaneously with the talks on Missile Defense." The local "Zycie Warszawy" wrote that, "The U.S. has proposed to hold talks about the possibility of transferring a few billion dollars worth of military equipment. This equipment is to be transferred to Poland in the form of purchase, lease or rent within a couple of years." 13. (U) Delegation List U.S. Delegation AA/S for PM Ambassador Stephen Mull DASD Dan Fata A/DCM, Mary T. Curtin, U.S. Embassy Warsaw Anita Friedt, Office Director, EUR/PRA LtCol Reggie Robinson, Senior Military Advisor, PM Kristin Dowley, Foreign Affairs Officer, PM Richard Dotson, Poland Country Program Director, OSD/P Col Vince O,Conner, Poland Desk, Joint Staff Maj Marek Stobbe, Poland Desk, EUCOM Sue McClure, Poland Country Program Director, DSCA Bernd Micael Arnold, DIA Col Richard Runner, DATT, U.S. Embassy Warsaw LtCol Ray Wojcik, Office of Defense Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Warsaw David T. Morris, Control Officer, U.S. Embassy Warsaw John Gorkowski, Notetaker, U.S. Embassy Warsaw Polish Delegation Witold Waszczykowski, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Stanislaw Komorowski, Under Secretary of Defense Robert Kupiecki, MFA Director of Security Policy Piotr Pacholski, Director of the MOD Missile Defense Office Col Tomasz Jakusz, Chief of Air Defense Col Jerzy Grodecki, MOD Budget Department Zbigniew Czech, MFA Department of Treaty Law LtCol Marek Kuszmider, Office of Strategic Planning (P5) LtCol Romuald Maksymiuk, MOD Department of Armaments LtCol Jan Gabrys, Air Force Headquarters LtCol Jozef Kozlowski, Military Intelligence Service Waldemar Pawlicki, Military Counter Intelligence Service Malgorzata Kosiura-Kazmierska, MFA Department of Security Policy Grzegorz Kozlowski, MFA Department of Security Policy Barbara Cwioro, Personal Assistant to U/S Waszczykowski Aleksander Jakimowicz, Interpreter 14. (U) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Mull and DASD Fata. CURTIN C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 004767 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2017 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MCAP, MARR, IN, RS, CH SUBJECT: MEA INSISTS INDIAN POLICY ON U.S.-LED MISSILE DEFENSE HAS NOT CHANGED REF: A. NEW DELHI 8353 B. NEW DELHI 8105 C. NEW DELHI 02039 Classified By: Acting PolCouns Atul Keshap, for reasons 1.4 (a, b, d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: Following the October 24 trilateral meeting in Harbin, China, reporters asked Indian Minister for External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee if India was going to join a U.S.-led missile defense system. Mukherjee dismissed the idea as "groundless." Despite press reports here signaling an abrupt shift away from the U.S. on missile defense, MEA contacts confirm this did not mean India was not interested in continuing to cooperate with the U.S. on missile defense technology and that there has been no change from the current level of bilateral missile defense cooperation. Indian officials tell us Mukherjee's comments were misconstrued by the Indian press, who failed to distinguish between the missile defense system discussed between the U.S. and Russia recently and the more generalized cooperation on missile defense agreed to by the U.S. and India in the 2005 Defense Framework. Foreign Secretary Menon's explanation of the Mukherjee comment is reported septel. END SUMMARY. 2. (SBU) The Foreign Ministers of India, Russia and China met October 24 in Harbin, China for their third "troika" meeting. During the press conference after the trilateral, Mukherjee was asked by reporters if India would participate in the U.S.-led missile defense system, and replied that the Foreign Ministers had not discussed missile defense during the trilateral, and explained "India does not take part in such military arrangements." (Comment: Reporters were apparently referring to the U.S.-led initiative to install missile-detection systems in Europe, to which both the Russian and Chinese officials had just made statements. End Comment). 3. (SBU) Mukherjee's comments were apparently taken out of context by several media outlets such as the Times of India, who published an article October 24 under the headline "India won't be part of US Missile Defense system: Pranab (Mukherjee)." The Hindu also published an article including the subheading "Not to be part of U.S. defense arrangement." 3. (SBU) While Indian media suggested Mukherjee's statement was a departure from India's support of the U.S. concept of missile defense (MD), it was not inconsistent with the GOI's longstanding position on MD cooperation with the U.S. The GOI has engaged with the U.S. on exploratory talks on MD since 2001, with both sides exchanging visits of technical teams and policymakers, yet India has thus far not agreed to extend the cooperation beyond discussion into more binding collaboration. While serving as Minister of Defense in 2005, Mukherjee stated that India has no intention of "accepting a missile shield from anyone." MEA Director Amandeep Singh Gill (Disarmament and International Security) confirmed to PolOff October 26 that Mukherjee's comment in Harbin cannot be interpreted as a deviation from the status quo of current U.S.-India MD cooperation. Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony declared publicly on October 25 that despite domestic political opposition from Indian Leftist parties, "military interaction with the U.S. will continue" into the future. -- BACKGROUND -- 4. (C) India was among the first countries to welcome President Bush's May 2001 call for development of missile defenses. President Bush first proposed the possibility of exploring cooperation on MD with India in a May 2001 meeting with then-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and officials from both countries discussed this idea in more detail at the 2001 and 2002 U.S.-India Defense Policy Group meetings. Then-Defense Minister Mukherjee and SecDef Rumsfeld agreed to expand collaboration relating to missile defense in the July 2005 U.S.-India Defense Framework Agreement. India has incorporated missile defense into its national security policy, as articulated by Dr. Saraswat, the Indian scientist NEW DELHI 00004767 002 OF 002 in charge of India's MD program, who told Emboffs during U.S.-India bilateral talks in April 2007 that India's MD program "was in keeping with the two stated policies for India's nuclear program" (ref A)(i.e. no first use, and maintaining a minimum credible deterrent.) At the time Saraswat went on to clarify that "Indian policy makers have not yet devised an overarching MD policy." 5. (SBU) After 2001 India began to consider purchasing off-the-shelf MD systems such as the U.S. Patriot 3, the Israeli-U.S. Arrow 2, and the Russian S-300 system. While not entirely abandoning those plans, the GOI has focused its attention increasingly on developing indigenous MD system capabilities, giving the go-ahead to its Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to produce a working model. DRDO's achievements in creating a functioning BMD system have been modest, with only one claimed successful test of a missile interceptor vehicle over the Bay of Bengal in November 2006 (ref B). -- COMMENT: NO CHANGE IN INDIAN POLICY -- 6. (C) COMMENT: Mukherjee's comments were apparently taken out of context, but our MEA contacts reassured us that his answer did not represent a deviation from the GOI's current level of cooperation on MD with the U.S., which has thus far been confined to technical and fact-finding discussions. Given the current state-of-play of political churn in domestic Indian politics, with the UPA administration taking great heat from the Left over any cooperation with the U.S., it is not surprising that the media would twist Mukherjee's statements into an apparent rejection of U.S.-led initiatives. It is also reassuring that Antony publicly signaled business-as-usual in U.S.-India military to military cooperation, despite what the Left wants. END COMMENT. MULFORD C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001095 SIPDIS SIPDIS MOSCOW PASS VLADIVOSTOK HELSINKI PASS ST. PETERSBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016 TAGS: PREL, MARR, PARM, JA, RS SUBJECT: JAPAN-RUSSIA POL-MIL DIALOGUE REVIEWS MISSILE DEFENSE AND ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY REF: 07 TOKYO 5019 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (B) (D) 1. (C) Summary. Russia inquired about the status of United States-Japan ballistic missile cooperation, including whether Tokyo's ballistic missile defense (BMD) system could obtain data directly from the United States, during the April 11 Japan-Russia Political-Military Dialogue in Tokyo. Japan responded its BMD system is purely defensive, and that Tokyo &would determine on its own, independent of Washington, whether to use missile defense.8 On Asia-Pacific regional security, the two sides exchanged views on elements that might lead to instability, with Russia noting that future regional challenges are likely to come from new threats such as international terrorism. Japan welcomed Moscow's expanded interest in the Asia-Pacific region, and Russia urged both nations to address new developments through better cooperation and improved information sharing. End Summary. ------------------- Dialogue Re-started ------------------- 2. (C) On April 15, Russia Division Principal Deputy Director Kotaro Otsuki briefed Embassy Tokyo on the April 11 Japan-Russia Political-Military Dialogue in Tokyo. Deputy Foreign Minister Kenichiro Sasae led a four-hour discussion with Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak on security-related topics, including BMD, NATO, North Korea, and Asia-Pacific regional security. Otsuki said the bilateral dialogue began as a "2 2"-type meeting "in the late 1990's," evolved into a Defense Ministerial-only discussion, and ended as a result of the 2003 Muneo Suzuki scandal involving the Northern Territories issue. Japanese officials offered to re-start the Political-Military Dialogue following Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's October 2007 Tokyo visit, during with the Russian FM expressed concerns about Japan's missile defense cooperation with the United States (Ref A). --------------- Missile Defense --------------- 3. (C) According to Otsuki, Kislyak asked questions about the status of United States-Japan BMD cooperation, including whether Tokyo could obtain data directly from United States platforms (e.g., Aegis warships). Sasae explained the status of the research and development effort between Tokyo and Washington, and noted Japan's BMD system is purely defensive. Otsuki, suggesting that the Tokyo delegation either did not know and/or did not wish to discuss the technical details, said that Sasae denied there is a political linkage regarding any potential decision to employ BMD. In other words, Tokyo would determine on its own, independent of Washington, whether to use missile defense, Otsuki relayed. Otsuki, who attend the BMD portion of the meeting, opined that Moscow seemed to be concerned about whether Japan's system could be used jointly with the United States. ------------ Asia-Pacific ------------ 4. (C) Sasae and Kislyak also exchanged views on elements in the Asia-Pacific region that might lead to instability. Sasae said Japan welcomes Russia's expanded interest in the Asia-Pacific region and is ready to cooperate with Moscow to improve the security environment. The Russian delegation responded that, while Cold War thinking exists in Europe, TOKYO 00001095 002 OF 002 challenges in the Asia-Pacific theatre will come from new threats such as international terrorism. Kislyak urged both nations to address these new developments through better cooperation and improved information sharing. Otsuki reflected that Moscow sees the Asia-Pacific region as being devoid of the kind of East-West confrontation that Russia believes still exists in Europe. ---- NATO ---- 5. (C) Sasae and Kislyak exchanged views on each country's bilateral cooperation with NATO (Japan-NATO, Russia-NATO). The Tokyo side referred to cooperative assistance programs with the provisional reconstruction teams in Afghanistan. Kislyak complained that ongoing discussions in NATO about eastward expansion are causing difficulties and problems because the Alliance wants to expand to the border of the former USSR. ----------- North Korea ----------- 6. (C) Japan asked for Russia's support in resolving the abduction, nuclear, and missile issues. The Russian delegation, according to Otsuki, noted the important role played by China, and said all parties must increase efforts to resolve problems. SCHIEFFER

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