S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001998 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR BADER EO 12958 DECL: 08/13/2019 TAGS PTER, KCRM, TH, RS, CO SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON THE VIKTOR BOUT EXTRADITION CASE IN THE WAKE OF LOWER COURT DEFEAT REF: BANGKOK 385 (NOTAL) Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. The disappointing August 11 Thai Lower Court ruling against the extradition of Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout, and its dubious legal reasoning, requires a multi-pronged effort to seek a successful reversal during the appeals process. The lead judge’s foray into foreign policy, rejecting the terrorism label and in effect embracing the FARC’s activities as purely political in nature, not criminal or acts of terrorism, has implications for Thailand. His confusion of the “dual criminality” concept with jurisdictional issues similarly raises questions for efforts by Thailand to extradite fugitive former PM Thaksin to face justice. The Embassy is working with Thai authorities to file an appeal of the lower court’s ruling and to press home the implications of the court ruling were Bout to walk free. In the early afternoon on August 13, we were assured that the notice of intention to appeal has been filed. ¶ 2. (C) At the same time, the Embassy recommends the State Department, Attorney General Holder, and the US Mission to the UN in New York engage the Thai Ambassador in Washington and the Thai PermRep in New Y ork in parallel. In addition, the Department should seriously consider asking Belgium, which issued an arrest warrant for Bout in 2002 for money laundering and conspiracy, Colombia, in the case of the FARC, and African countries which have suffered greatly from Bout’s arms trade in the past to weigh in with the RTG. Finally, we recommend consideration of laying down a marker in Moscow about Bout, looking forward to the possibility that Bout may end up back in Russia were the appeal of the Lower Court ruling might not succeed. End Summary and comment. Thai Lower Court rules against Bout extradition --------------------------------------------- -- ¶ 3. (C) On August 11, the judge in the Viktor Bout extradition case ruled against U.S. and Thai government efforts to extradite Bout to the United States. Two key elements of his reasoning were: that the FARC in Colombia, to which Bout was conspiring to send weapons, was a political rather than a terrorist group; and that the “dual criminality” standard of our extradition treaty with Thailand had not been met since Bout could not be prosecuted in Thailand on the charges which the U.S. wants him to face in the U.S. In our view, the judge was wrong on both counts. ¶ 4. (C) After the verdict, as the Department has seen, the DCM spoke on the record to press outside the court room and expressed disappointment and mystification over the ruling and stated that we would fully support RTG efforts to appeal the decision. We have continued the same themes in subsequent interactions with the press. Engaging the Thai immediately ----------------------------- ¶ 5. (C) The Ambassador called Foreign Minister Kasit immediately after the verdict on August 11 and expressed deep disappointment, noting that the verdict was not justified on legal grounds and that the judge had clearly been in error on several key points. He reminded Kasit that over the past year and a half since Bout’s arrest in Bangkok, the USG had repeatedly underlined the importance of the case, all the way up to the Secretary of State and POTUS levels. In the short-term, the Ambassador told Kasit, we need the Foreign Ministry to do its part in forwarding the necessary documentation to the Attorney-General’s office so that the intent to appeal can be filed in the requisite forty-eight hours. (Note: Although the court’s ruling and a new extradition law specify that the appeal must be filed within 72 hours, the applicable extradition law sets forth the shorter time frame, which we have followed.) Kasit assured the Ambassador that he had already instructed his legal department to do so. The Ambassador also told Kasit that we expected Bout would remain in detention during the appeals process. The MFA’s Legal and Treaties Department faxed the Attorney General’s office late evening August 11 supporting the appeal; at the request of the Office of the Attorney General, the Embassy sent a diplomatic note to the MFA and the OAG on August 13 requesting that the RTG appeal the lower court verdict prior to the forty-eight hour deadline (note: the RTG was closed August 12 for a National Holiday, the Queen’s Birthday.) At approximately 1:25 p.m. on August 13, the MFA and OAG advised the Embassy that the requisite notice of intention to appeal had been filed and received by the court. Next steps ---------- ¶6. (C) The Embassy’s “Bout team” met August 13 to review next steps that will help us prevail on appeal. Our immediate priority was to ensure that the notice of intent to appeal was filed on time (within 48 hours of the verdict) and that the appeal itself is filed within thirty days of the verdict. ¶ 7. (C) We will make clear to the RTG that we expect Bout to remain incarcerated during the appeals process, as specified under Thai law and the August 11 court ruling. Given that the same judge will rule on any bail motions brought by Bout (we expect Bout’s attorneys to push hard on bail), however, his custody status during the pendency of the appeal is a genuine concern. We also intend to make clear to the Thai government (the Ambassador is seeking to call FM Kasit, in Malaysia August 13-14 on a working visit, and will engage the highest available MFA official in Bangkok) that we expect this deficient ruling to receive a comprehensive and meaningful review by the appellate court. Moreover, the Ambassador plans to tell Kasit and other senior Thai officials that, given that the Thai government arrested Bout and sought his extradition to the U.S., the Thai government should be as alarmed by the judge’s ruling as we are. Therefore, we would encourage the RTG to issue a public statement expressing disappointment in the judge’s decision, its intention to win on appeal, and a reiteration of Thailand’s commitment to both the struggle against international terrorism and to its extensive law enforcement relationship with the United States. The Ambassador intends to make similar points to newly appointed NSC Secretary General Tawee and to key figures at the Palace. Without being counter-productively heavy-handed, we will make clear that we see Thai executive branch reaction to the ruling as a test of the relationship. ¶ 8. (C) At the same time, however, we believe it is important to remember that our partners in the Royal Thai Police, the Office of the Attorney General, the Foreign Ministry, and even the Royal Thai Navy, largely did everything we asked them to do on the Bout case, including going the extra mile to facilitate our requests. Our posture and actions thus should make clear that we are disappointed with the judge’s ruling but not with Thai government cooperation in the Bout case. ¶ 9. (C) That said, coming on the heels of the September 2008 Thai appellate ruling affirming a lower court’s denial of our request to extradite Iranian Jamshid Ghassemi, who was in Thailand to procure controlled technology in violation of the Arms Export Control Act, the question has to be asked whether we can count on the Thai courts to do the right thing on high-profile extradition cases that will affect Thailand’s relations with third countries (we continue to have a perfect record on routine extraditions from Thailand to the United States). Our reluctant conclusion is that we cannot. ¶ 10. (S) The Department will recall that in February of this year, after significant indications that the Russians were trying to use bribes to influence the outcome of the case, the Ambassador made representations to Prime Minister Abhisit (reftel) that we expected the process to be free of inappropriate influence and Abhisit undertook to do so. The Ambassador also intervened at the same time with Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan and the Royal Thai Naval Commander Khamtorn Pumhiran to insist that false testimony by xxxxxxxxx (that Bout had been in Thailand as part of a routine naval procurement) be rebutted. The Thai Navy subsequently issued a letter to that effect. We will remind the Thais of their commitment to a clean process and ask that they assure us again on the front. What We are Doing here/What We Suggest Washington Do --------------------------------------------- ------- ¶ 11. (C) Given the above, we are undertaking the following steps here in Bangkok, most of which should also be reflected when the Department calls in Thai Ambassador Don Pramuwinai, a move we fully support: -- The Ambassador will immediately seek a meeting with Foreign Minister Kasit and other appropriate senior Thai officials to make clear that, while we appreciate the cooperation on Bout over the past year and a half, we are disappointed and mystified by the judge’s ruling, which is flawed on several key points. -- In particular, the judge’s characterization of the FARC as a legitimate political actor would suggest that insurgent groups in southern Thailand are likewise political in nature, perhaps outside the scope of Thailand’s new counterterrorism laws. The ruling also suggests that anyone seeking to send them arms from a third country could not be extradited to Thailand on political grounds. -- Moreover, the judge’s misguided analysis of the “dual criminality” standard suggests that fugitives cannot be extradited from Thailand unless a Thai court actually had jurisdiction over the alleged crime, not whether the alleged conduct is viewed as criminal conduct under the laws of both countries. This decision comes at the same time Thailand is pursuing extradition of fugitive former PM Thaksin Shinawatra for abuse of power/corruption-related charges; the judge’s ruling would also seem to undermine RTG positions in their Thaksin extradition effort. -- Therefore, we expect that the AG’s office will vigorously pursue the appeal of the ruling and that Bout will remain incarcerated during the pendency of the appeal. -- We seek assurances that the case will be afforded a comprehensive and meaningful appellate review, presumably handled by serious, experienced Thai judges. (Note: Appeals are normally handled by a panel of three judges. End Note.) -- We ask that the Thai government issue a statement making clear its own disappointment with the judge’s ruling and reiterating its commitment to the fight against international terrorism and to the law enforcement relationship with the U.S. -- We will continue to make our points to the press and we are pulling together a “FARC fact sheet” for public distribution that we will send in to Washington for comment and clearance today. ¶ 12. (C) We suggest that Washington strongly consider the following actions: -- In addition to the Department calling in the Thai Ambassador, we recommend that Attorney General Holder also call him in. AG Holder could point out the extensive U.S. commitment of law enforcement resources to Thailand (DEA and other), as well as our judicial training efforts, and that a statement from the RTG as outlined above would be very helpful as the U.S. decides where best to commit its law enforcement resources around the world. A senior DEA official might also wish to sit in to highlight the massive DEA commitment to Thailand. (Note: Our DOJ Attache who has led our legal efforts on Bout here will be in Washington on August 20-21. End Note.) -- Discussion of a POTUS telcon to PM Abhisit has been under way for some time; they have not spoken in the seven months both have been in office. We suggest that the call be accelerated and that it include a serious discussion of our concerns over the implications of the Bout verdict, as outlined above. We believe POTUS involvement on Bout would have significant effect here. -- We suggest Washington engage the Colombian government on the implications of the Bout verdict. We suggest inquiring whether Colombia considers the FARC to be a terrorist organization, whether it would be willing to submit a brief in the appeals process, and also make public statements to that effect. We also suggest exploring whether Colombia would be willing to ask Thailand for Bout’s extradition while he (hopefully) is still in detention during the appeals process. (Note: There is no Colombian Embassy in Bangkok; the Embassy in Kuala Lumpur covers Thailand. We understand the Thais cover Colombia from their Embassy in Lima. End note.) It would be useful if the Government of Colombia also raised its concerns in Moscow. -- We also suggest exploring the possibility of whether governments whose citizens have borne the bloody results of Bout’s activities over the years, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo, would be willing to publicly express dismay/engage the Thai government on the verdict and w hether any affected government would be willing to ask for his extradition. -- While the Bout focus is now on Thailand, this is at heart a U.S.-Russian matter. The Department may wish to make clear to Moscow our concerns on Bout’s activities and seek assurances that they will cease. Also, we should consider asking the Russians to prosecute Bout if, in the end, he walks here in Thailand. At the very least perhaps we could force the Russians to publicly refuse to do so. -- The Thai ruling seems inconsistent with several United Nations determinations on Bout’s nature over the years (see below). We suggest our USUN call in the Thai Permrep and lay out how we view the issues in terms of Thailand’s standing with the United Nations. Better yet would be for the appropriate UN official to call in the Thai Permrep and seek an explanation of how the verdict can be justified in light of Thailand’s support of relevant UN resolutions: - UNSCR 1521 (2003) - Liberia - UNSCR 1343 (March 2001) - Liberia - Report of Experts Panel under 1343 - Final Monitoring Report on Angola Sanctions (2000) -- Finally, despite the listing by the US and EU of the FARC as a terrorist organization, we understand that the FARC is not listed as such by the UN. A move to have the FARC listed formally by the UN would assist the effort to keep Bout in custody. JOHN Source: http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09BANGKOK1998.html AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PM ABHISIT AND DEFENSE MINISTER VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHBK #0385/01 0441019 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 131019Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6044 INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1568 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 5408 RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE S E C R E T BANGKOK 000385 SIPDIS EO 12958 DECL: 02/13/2019 TAGS PTER, KCRM, TH SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PM ABHISIT AND DEFENSE MINISTER ON VIKTOR BOUT EXTRADITION CASE Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary. During a February 12 meeting, the Ambassador raised with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva the ongoing extradition case concerning Russian international arms trafficker Viktor Bout and serious concerns that Bout’s associates had been able to influence testimony given by [naval officer]. Abhisit told the Ambassador that he would address any “irregularities” in the case through “appropriate channels.” The Ambassador also raised USG concerns with the [naval officer] testimony during a February 13 introductory call with Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan. Prawit committed to looking into the testimony in order to determine the truth. ¶ 2. (S) Comment. Since Viktor Bout’s arrest in Bangkok almost a year ago, moving towards a successful extradition to the United States has been at the top of our bilateral agenda here. In addition to Embassy efforts over the months, President Bush raised it with then-Prime Minister Samak during his August 2008 visit to Bangkok. Overall, our sense has been that while the extradition proceedings have been painfully slow (and have required constant nurturing by our DOJ and DEA personnel every step of the way), they are moving in the direction we want. Lately, however, there have been disturbing indications that Bout’s advocates and Russian supporters have been using money and influence in an attempt to block extradition. The most egregious example was the false testimony of [the Crown prince’s secretary] that Bout was in Thailand as part of government-to-government submarine deal. Thus, we felt it was time to once again raise the matter at the top of the government and make clear that, while we understand the judicial process must take its course without political interference, we insist that the process be free of corruption and undue influence. We will continue to do so in the months ahead. We understand AG Holder may soon call the Thai AG to review the case (as previous AG Mukasey did three times in addition to his visit to Bangkok last summer). Combined with our efforts this week, the call will make for an important one-two punch. End Summary and Comment. ABHISIT PROMISES TO LOOK INTO IRREGULARITIES IN BOUT CASE --------------------------------------------- ------------ ¶3. (S) During a February 12 meeting at the Parliament, the Ambassador raised with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva the ongoing extradition case concerning international arms trafficker Viktor Bout. (Note: Bout faces terrorism-related charges in federal court in New York for conspiring to sell millions of dollars of weapons to the FARC for use in killing Americans. He has remained in custody in Bangkok since his arrest on March 6, 2008. End note.) The Ambassador noted that, while the U.S. and Thailand enjoy a strong extradition relationship, our countries must ensure that the bilateral extradition treaty worked in our most important cases, such as those involving terrorism. In this regard, the Ambassador emphasized to Abhisit that the extradition case against Bout is a high priority for the United States. Citing the United Nations’ sanctions against Bout, the Ambassador also noted that the extradition case is one of global importance. Abhisit told that Ambassador that he believed that his office had limited means to affect ongoing extradition proceedings, stating that the judicial system was designed to afford due process to the parties and expressing an unwillingness to be seen as “overruling” this process, or “helping one side.” ¶ 4. (S) Expressing growing concern about the extradition proceedings, the Ambassador then described evidence showing that the extradition proceedings against Bout have become tainted as a result of the efforts by Bout’s associates to bribe Thai officials. In particular, the Ambassador detailed false testimony on Bout’s behalf from [the naval officer] to the effect that Bout came to Thailand to conduct official business with the Thai government relating to a submarine project; recorded statements by a Thai associate of Bout that he had procured [the crown prince’s secretary?] to testify on Bout’s behalf; evidence of bribery schemes gathered throughout the world; and a scheme to arrest and thereby embarrass two U.S. diplomats - i.e., DEA agents assigned to the Bout investigation - on meritless charges of participating in illegal recordings of Bout on the day of his arrest. If the xxxxxxxxxxxx false testimony remained unrebutted, the court could possibly deny extradition based on an erroneous conclusion that RTG had legitimate dealings with Bout, a U.N.-sanctioned arms trafficker. ¶5. (S) In light of this evidence, the Ambassador asked the Prime Minster to take steps to ensure that the proceedings in Bout’s extradition case were free from the taint of bribery and corruption. In particular, the Ambassador suggested that testimony from an authoritative witness from the Royal Thai Navy or the Ministry of Defense should be offered to repudiate the xxxxxxxxxx statement and make clear that the RTG supports the extradition request. The Ambassador also reminded the PM of the recent case of Jamshid Ghassemi, in which the Thai authorities denied a U.S. extradition request under apparent pressure from Iran, and stressed the importance of avoiding a similar result here. (Note: Ghassemi is under indictment in San Diego for violations of the Arms Export Control Act and money laundering relating to his conspiracy to acquire accelerometers used in missile navigation. End note.) The Ambassador also stated that Thailand’s failure to ensure an extradition process in Bout that is free from corruption and undue influence would constitute a major setback to the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Thailand, especially in the area of law enforcement. ¶6. (S) After listening to the evidence provided by the Ambassador suggesting that bribery had infected the Bout proceedings, Abhisit committed to addressing any “irregularities” in the extradition case through the “appropriate channels.” At the conclusion of the meeting, the Prime Minister sought the identity of the individuals involved in the bribery schemes, and the DOJ Attache, who accompanied the Ambassador to the meeting, supplied an aide to the PM with the requested information. DEFENSE MINISTER COMMITS TO LOOKING INTO TESTIMONY --------------------------------------------- ----- ¶7. (S) During a February 13 introductory call, the Ambassador highlighted to Minister of Defense Prawit Wongsuwan the importance the USG places on the Bout extradition proceedings. The Ambassador noted that the USG understood that extradition cases take time and that the USG respected the Thai judicial system, but we were concerned about efforts by Bout to improperly influence the proceedings. Of particular concern was the false testimony by xxxxxxxxx the Ambassador told Prawit. Thexxxxxxxxxx testimony was not true and, as such, it was very important that the Thai Navy or the Ministry of Defense correct this falsehood with testimony to the court. Doing so would ensure that the proceedings were kept on track and would publicly clarify that the Thai military was not associated with a U.N.-sanctioned arms trafficker. Prawit told the Ambassador that he was unfamiliar with the case but that he would give priority to looking into the issue to determine the truth regarding the testimony ofxxxxxxxxx. The Defense Minister also committed to examining a non-paper with more details on the testimony of xxxxxxxxxxx that the DOJ Attache provided to an aide to Prawit. JOHN Source: http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09BANGKOK385.html Not-redacted version: 1. (S) Summary. During a February 12 meeting, the Ambassador raised with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva the ongoing extradition case concerning Russian international arms trafficker Viktor Bout and serious concerns that Bout's associates had been able to influence testimony given by a Thai Navy captain. Abhisit told the Ambassador that he would address any "irregularities" in the case through "appropriate channels." The Ambassador also raised USG concerns with the Navy captain's testimony during a February 13 introductory call with Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan. Prawit committed to looking into the testimony in order to determine the truth. 2. (S) Comment. Since Viktor Bout's arrest in Bangkok almost a year ago, moving towards a successful extradition to the United States has been at the top of our bilateral agenda here. In addition to Embassy efforts over the months, President Bush raised it with then-Prime Minister Samak during his August 2008 visit to Bangkok. Overall, our sense has been that while the extradition proceedings have been painfully slow (and have required constant nurturing by our DOJ and DEA personnel every step of the way), they are moving in the direction we want. Lately, however, there have been disturbing indications that Bout's defense team and Russian supporters have been using money and influence in an attempt to block extradition. The most egregious example was the false testimony of a Thai naval officer that Bout was in Thailand as part of government-to-government submarine deal. Thus, we felt it was time to once again raise the matter at the top of the government and make clear that, while we understand the judicial process must take its course without political interference, we insist that the process be free of corruption and undue influence. We will continue to do so in the months ahead. We understand AG Holder may soon call the Thai AG to review the case (as previous AG Mukasey did three times in addition to his visit to Bangkok last summer). Combined with our efforts this week, the call will make for an important one-two punch. End Summary and Comment. ABHISIT PROMISES TO LOOK INTO IRREGULARITIES IN BOUT CASE --------------------------------------------- ------------ 3. (S) During a February 12 meeting at the Parliament, the Ambassador raised with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva the ongoing extradition case concerning international arms trafficker Viktor Bout. (Note: Bout faces terrorism-related charges in federal court in New York for conspiring to sell millions of dollars of weapons to the FARC for use in killing Americans. He has remained in custody in Bangkok since his arrest on March 6, 2008. End note.) The Ambassador noted that, while the U.S. and Thailand enjoy a strong extradition relationship, our countries must ensure that the bilateral extradition treaty worked in our most important cases, such as those involving terrorism. In this regard, the Ambassador emphasized to Abhisit that the extradition case against Bout is a high priority for the United States. Citing the United Nations' sanctions against Bout, the Ambassador also noted that the extradition case is one of global importance. Abhisit told that Ambassador that he believed that his office had limited means to affect ongoing extradition proceedings, stating that the judicial system was designed to afford due process to the parties and expressing an unwillingness to be seen as "overruling" this process, or "helping one side." 4. (S) Expressing growing concern about the extradition proceedings, the Ambassador then described evidence showing that the extradition proceedings against Bout have become tainted as a result of the efforts by Bout's associates to bribe Thai officials. In particular, the Ambassador detailed false testimony on Bout's behalf from a Royal Thai Navy captain to the effect that Bout came to Thailand to conduct official business with the Thai government relating to a submarine project; recorded statements by a Thai associate of Bout that he had procured the Personal Secretary to the Crown Prince to testify on Bout's behalf; evidence of bribery schemes gathered throughout the world; and a scheme to arrest and thereby embarrass two U.S. diplomats - i.e., DEA agents assigned to the Bout investigation - on meritless charges of participating in illegal recordings of Bout on the day of his arrest. If the Navy captain's false testimony remained unrebutted, the court could possibly deny extradition based on an erroneous conclusion that RTG had legitimate dealings with Bout, a U.N.-sanctioned arms trafficker. 5. (S) In light of this evidence, the Ambassador asked the Prime Minster to take steps to ensure that the proceedings in Bout's extradition case were free from the taint of bribery and corruption. In particular, the Ambassador suggested that testimony from an authoritative witness from the Royal Thai Navy or the Ministry of Defense should be offered to repudiate the Navy captain's statement and make clear that the RTG supports the extradition request. The Ambassador also reminded the PM of the recent case of Jamshid Ghassemi, in which the Thai authorities denied a U.S. extradition request under apparent pressure from Iran, and stressed the importance of avoiding a similar result here. (Note: Ghassemi is under indictment in San Diego for violations of the Arms Export Control Act and money laundering relating to his conspiracy to acquire accelerometers used in missile navigation. End note.) The Ambassador also stated that Thailand's failure to ensure an extradition process in Bout that is free from corruption and undue influence would constitute a major setback to the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Thailand, especially in the area of law enforcement. 6. (S) After listening to the evidence provided by the Ambassador suggesting that bribery had infected the Bout proceedings, Abhisit committed to addressing any "irregularities" in the extradition case through the "appropriate channels." At the conclusion of the meeting, the Prime Minister sought the identity of the individuals involved in the bribery schemes, and the DOJ Attache, who accompanied the Ambassador to the meeting, supplied an aide to the PM with the requested information. DEFENSE MINISTER COMMITS TO LOOKING INTO TESTIMONY --------------------------------------------- ----- 7. (S) During a February 13 introductory call, the Ambassador highlighted to Minister of Defense Prawit Wongsuwan the importance the USG places on the Bout extradition proceedings. The Ambassador noted that the USG understood that extradition cases take time and that the USG respected the Thai judicial system, but we were concerned about efforts by Bout to improperly influence the proceedings. Of particular concern was the false testimony by the Thai Navy captain, the Ambassador told Prawit. The captain's testimony was not true and, as such, it was very important that the Thai Navy or the Ministry of Defense correct this falsehood with testimony to the court. Doing so would ensure that the proceedings were kept on track and would publicly clarify that the Thai military was not associated with a U.N.-sanctioned arms trafficker. Prawit told the Ambassador that he was unfamiliar with the case but that he would give priority to looking into the issue to determine the truth regarding the testimony of the Thai Navy captain. The Defense Minister also committed to examining a non-paper with more details on the testimony of the navy captain that the DOJ Attache provided to an aide to Prawit. JOHN 195368 3/5/2009 10:00 09BANGKOK567 Embassy Bangkok SECRET 09BANGKOK385 VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHBK #0567/01 0641000 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 051000Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6290 INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1606 RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 5413 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY S E C R E T BANGKOK 000567 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2019 TAGS: PTER, PREL, PARM, PGOV, ECON, KCRM, KJUS, TH, RU SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES DEPUTY PM SUTHEP ON VIKTOR BOUT EXTRADITION, DISCUSSES THAI POLITICAL SITUATION REF: BANGKOK 385 (ENGAGING PM ON BOUT) Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (S) Summary: The Ambassador on March 4 pressed Thai Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban to ensure retraction or rebuttal of false court testimony in the extradition proceedings of Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout, which resume March 6. Suthep said Prime Minister Abhisit had previously discussed the matter with him, and he would investigate and take appropriate action. On Thai politics, Suthep said the Thai public expected Abhisit to steer Thailand through the global economic crisis, even though many factors were outside of Abhisit's control. He cautioned against underestimating the influence of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Suthep briefly discussed RTG counterinsurgency efforts in southern Thailand, and the Ambassador said he hoped for a breakthrough in the case of missing lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit. 2. (S) Comment: Suthep clearly was familiar with the Bout case and understands it is a top priority for the USG. Separately, an official close to Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn assured us that the Crown Prince's associates had no connection with Bout and his team. Nevertheless, we have not yet seen that high-level RTG officials are prepared to engage actively with prosecutors to assure the highest possible probability of Bout's extradition. We will continue monitoring the extradition proceedings and pressing for a speedy and proper outcome. End Summary and Comment. VIKTOR BOUT ----------- 3. (SBU) The Ambassador, accompanied by Poloff, called on Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban at Government House on March 4. As Deputy PM, Suthep is responsible for all security-related agencies, including the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Justice; the Royal Thai Police; the National Security Council; and the National Intelligence Agency. Additionally, Suthep serves as Secretary General of the Democrat Party, and he has long worked closely with DP Leader (now Prime Minister) Abhisit Vejjajiva. 4. (S) Following opening pleasantries, the Ambassador said he wanted to raise the "critical" issue of Viktor Bout's extradition. This case was extremely important to the U.S. President Bush had raised it with Prime Minister Samak during an August 2008 visit, and it remained important for President Obama. Hours earlier, U.S. Attorney General Holder had discussed the case over the telephone with his Thai counterpart, the Ambassador explained. 5. (S) The Ambassador acknowledged that the extradition case had to move through Thai legal processes, but the U.S. was concerned that there had been "serious problems" in those processes, as the Ambassador had explained recently to PM Abhisit (reftel). Bout and his lawyers were using non-legal means to attempt to influence the outcome of the case, and one result was the false testimony of a Royal Thai Navy (RTN) officer, who had indicated in court in late December that Bout had come to Thailand on a quasi-official mission (reftel). 6. (S) DPM Suthep said Abhisit had discussed the matter with him, as well as with the Defense Minister. Abhisit had stressed the USG interest in Bout's extradition, and the RTG had no interest in obstructing this. Suthep pledged to investigate the RTN official's actions, and whether he had testified in court in an official or private capacity. The Ambassador emphasized that, given the false testimony from an RTN official, it would be most appropriate for a higher-ranking RTN official to explain in court proceedings that Bout had not/not come to Thailand on a quasi-official mission. The Ambassador reiterated the critical nature of this case, emphasizing the lethal threat Bout had posed to the safety of American citizens. He added that a DOJ prosecutor was working at the Embassy and would be pleased to work more extensively with the Thais on this matter. Suthep reiterated his willingness in principle to assist and said he would welcome whatever information we could provide. 7. (S) Separately, Niphon Promphan (Secretary General to the Prime Minister and a close associate of the Crown Prince) told us that he had met on March 2 with the Secretary to Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, Air Chief Marshall Satitpong Sukvimol, and had relayed our concern that Bout would receive assistance from the Crown Prince's office (reftel). Niphon told us that Satitpong denied that he or others in the Crown Prince's entourage had any association with Bout. Satitpong said he would use his resources to investigate this false claim of ties to the Palace. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE ECONOMY --------------------------------- 8. (C) Following their discussion of legal matters, the Ambassador asked Suthep's view of the domestic political situation. Suthep said he was not worried about the possibility of a no-confidence debate in the parliament. Rather, he was more concerned about efforts by "redshirt" activists allied with former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to stir up popular sentiment against the government. Suthep said it was important not to underestimate Thaksin, who would not easily surrender and retained extensive financial resources. To address the populace's concerns, the RTG was sending cabinet Ministers to travel around the country and meet with both officials and the general public. 9. (C) Suthep said the Thai people expected Abhisit to steer Thailand through the current economic crisis. This was difficult for the administration, because the crisis was global and beyond Thailand's control. Suthep said he believed Thailand's extensive rural economy made the country less vulnerable than some others, but it would likely be necessary to follow up on the government's first stimulus program with subsequent efforts. The Ambassador noted that American corporations remained interested in making significant investments in Thailand, which, despite recent political turmoil, remained an appealing place for business. THE SOUTH, COUNTERNARCOTICS --------------------------- 10. (C) Noting that he bore special responsibilities for the security environment in southern Thailand, Suthep said he could assure the Ambassador that the RTG would adhere to the rule of law, and would not engage in extra-judicial killings. The Ambassador welcomed that assurance and said he hoped that the latest efforts to resolve the fate of missing lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit would succeed (note: Somchai disappeared March 12, 2004. End note). Suthep said he, too, was hopeful, although it was difficult to obtain new evidence in that case. 11. (C) Suthep explained that the RTG had formed a subgroup of the cabinet (including the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Education, and Health) to focus on the South, and it was devising a five-year plan to improve the quality of life for southerners. The Ambassador assured Suthep that the USG hoped these efforts would succeed, but we understood any direct U.S. involvement in the border provinces could backfire to the RTG's detriment. Suthep agreed with the Ambassador and remarked tangentially that he and others in the RTG were focusing on counternarcotics efforts and would welcome further cooperation with the USG in that field. ASEAN SUMMIT ------------ 12. (C) The Ambassador also congratulated Suthep on the RTG's successful hosting of the recent ASEAN Summit. The Ambassador explained that, in the run-up to the Summit, the Embassy's Regional Security Office had trained dozens of officials from the Police Special Branch in VIP protection methods. Suthep expressed his gratitude for this training. JOHN VZCZCXRO6557 PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHBK #0192/01 0250759 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 250759Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9667 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2258 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7904 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 6126 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0330 RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 7534 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY Monday, 25 January 2010, 07:59 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000192 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON EO 12958 DECL: 01/25/2030 TAGS PREL, PGOV, TH SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PRIVY COUNCIL CHAIR PREM, OTHER “ESTABLISHMENT” FIGURES ON YEAR AHEAD REF: BANGKOK 184 (SEH DAENG) BANGKOK 00000192 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador paid a series of New Year’s- related calls on influential Thai figures, including Privy Council Chair GEN Prem, Privy Council member ACM Siddhi, and former PM Anand, to discuss the year ahead. Abhisit’s performance, issues related to the royal family, and challenges posed by Thaksin/Hun Sen emerged as the primary themes. Prem offered a more positive assessment of Abhisit’s performance than Siddhi, who criticized Abhisit for a lack of resolve and the absence of an effective team to carry out his policies. All three focused on the challenge posed by Thaksin to the government and, indirectly, to the monarchy; Anand attributed part of the King’s poor health to Thaksin, and both Prem and Siddhi were upset about Thaksin’s alliance of convenience with Cambodian leader Hun Sen. All three had quite negative comments about Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn. While asserting that the Crown Prince will become King, both Siddhi and Anand implied the country would be better off if other arrangements could be made. Siddhi expressed preference for Princess Sirindhorn; Anand suggested only the King would be in a position to change succession, and acknowledged a low likelihood of that happening. ¶2. (S) Comment: On the two most difficult and sensitive issues of the day in Thailand -- Thaksin and the monarchy -- the Thai elite appear as unsure about the future as any other sector of society. The stakes are significant for all sides, and resolution of the political divide and royal succession could still be far over the horizon. Elite concerns about Abhisit in office appear to reflect less on his performance than on general worries about the ultimate resolution of issues. End Summary and Comment. Mixed Views on Abhisit’s performance ------------------------------------ ¶3. (C) Privy Councilor Chair GEN Prem shared his assessments of PM Abhisit, the Crown Prince’s relationship with Thaksin, and difficulties dealing with Cambodia/Hun Sen with Ambassador over lunch January 13. Regarding Abhisit, Prem referenced widespread criticism that the PM was too young and not strong enough to be an effective leader in trying times. However, Prem felt that Abhisit had proved in 2009 that he was up to the challenge of doing what was necessary to run a fractious coalition government, no easy task. In addition, there were no other politicians available who were more principled and had more integrity than Abhisit, and Thailand needed such a leader at this point. Prem expressed hope that Thais and foreigners alike would be more patient with Abhisit, who he believed was the right man to serve as premier. ¶4. (C) Fellow Privy Councilor ACM Siddhi, hosting Ambassador at his home January 11, was more critical of Abhisit than Prem. Siddhi said that he had told Abhisit’s father, his own long-time personal physician, that his son needed to be more decisive and “make more friends” in 2010. Abhisit spent too much time at the podium and not enough time assembling an effective team to which he could delegate action and rely on for well-thought out policy initiatives, in Siddhi’s view. Abhisit also needed to get out to engage the grassroots, one of Thaksin’s strengths. On Siddhi’s wish list: Abhisit pushing through a permanent appointment for Acting Police Chief Pratheep; using his power over wayward coalition parties by threatening parliamentary dissolution if they did not get in line; and telling the Army to take action to dismiss renegade MGEN Khattiya, even if Defense Minister Prawit refused to sign a dismissal order. Political Year Ahead -------------------- ¶5. (C) While GEN Prem expressed moderate concern about the potential for violence and political discord in early 2010, he felt the situation was no worse than six months ago. Prem asked about U.S. laws regarding demonstrations and avoiding BANGKOK 00000192 002.2 OF 003 excessive disruptions of government functions and daily lives of citizens; Ambassador explained the U.S. system of permits for protests which allowed for free speech but not free access everywhere. Ambassador shared U.S. frustration about decisions negatively affecting economic/investment climate, such as Ma Tha Phut and the digital lottery cancellation; the uneven application of the rule of law, breaches of contract, and regulatory shifts affected the investment climate more negatively at this point than political turmoil. ¶6. (C) ACM Siddhi expressed more concerns than Prem about the security situation in 2010, suggesting that Army Commander Anupong’s inability to control wayward red-affiliated MGEN Khattiya’s M-79 attacks on yellow-shirt rallies and trips to see Thaksin overseas was not a good harbinger (note: three days later, someone attacked Anupong’s office at night with an M-79, with Khattiya widely seen as the likely suspect, see reftel. End note). Siddhi said he had higher hopes for deputy Commander Prayuth, widely expected to replace Anupong in October and seen as particularly close to the Queen. Siddhi claimed Prem had sent a signal of his displeasure with Anupong by snubbing him during a group call at Prem’s residence to pass birthday greetings, not stopping to talk to Anupong personally as he did with other key military commanders. Royal Family: King, Crown Prince, Entourages -------------------------------------------- ¶7. (S) Regarding King Bhumibol’s health, Prem indicated that the King was exercising 30 minutes a day on a stationary bicycle at Siriraj Hospital and passing a medicine ball with a physical therapist to build up strength and regain weight. Prem acknowledged that he had not seen the King since the hospitalization, but that the Queen and Princess Sirindhorn saw the King daily. When Ambassador asked about the Crown Prince’s involvement, Prem repeated: the Queen and Sirindhorn visit him daily. ¶8. (S) Prem acknowledged Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn probably maintained some sort of relationship with fugitive former PM Thaksin, “seeing him from time to time.” Prem, clearly no fan of either man, cautioned that Thaksin ran the risk of self-delusion if he thought that the Crown Prince would act as his friend/supporter in the future merely because of Thaksin’s monetary support; “he does not enjoy that sort of relationship.” When Ambassador asked where the Crown Prince was currently, in Thailand or Europe, Prem replied dismissively: “You know his social life, how he is.” (Note: a presumed reference to Vajiralongkorn’s preference to spend time based out of Munich with his main mistress, rather than in Thailand with his wife and son). ¶9. (S) ACM Siddhi, in a similar vein, noted that the Crown Prince frequently slipped away from Thailand, and that information about his air hostess mistresses was widely available on websites; he lamented how his former aide, now Thai Ambassador to Germany, was forced to leave Berlin for Munich often to receive Vajiralongkorn. Siddhi raised Thaksin’s controversial November Times On-line interview, which Siddhi claimed cast the King in a bad light and attempted to praise the Crown Prince as broad-minded and educated abroad, hinting that Vajiralongkorn would be ready to welcome Thaksin back to Thailand once he became King. ¶10. (S) Ambassador mentioned to Siddhi the Crown Prince’s more engaging approach in the early December King’s Birthday reception with Ambassadors, shaking each envoy’s hand and appearing more at ease than in the 2008 reception. Siddhi stated that succession would be a difficult transition time for Thailand. According to Palace Law, the Crown Prince would succeed his father, but added after a pause, almost hopefully: “if the Crown Prince were to die, anything could happen, and maybe Prathep (Sirindhorn) could succeed.” ¶11. (S) Ambassador similarly raised the Crown Prince’s more confident demeanor with former PM Anand in late December, seeking Anand’s assessment of the dynamics in play as succession inevitably drew nearer. Anand’s response was BANGKOK 00000192 003.2 OF 003 similar to Siddhi’s, but more detailed and blunt. Anand said that he had always believed that the Crown Prince would succeed his father, according to law. However, there could be complicating factors -- if Vajiralongkohn proved unable to stay out of politics, or avoid embarrassing financial transactions. After a pause, Anand added that the consensus view among many Thai was that the Crown Prince could not stop either, nor would he be able, at age 57, to rectify his behavior. After another pause, Anand added that someone really should raise the matter with the King, before adding with regret that there really was no one who could raise such a delicate topic (note: implied was the need for an alternative to Vajiralongkorn). ¶12. (S) ACM Siddhi expressed his personal concern about the declining image of the royal family in Thailand, noting that something as simple as excessive motorcade-related traffic jams caused by minor royals was an unnecessary but enduring irritant. Personal Private Secretary Arsa Sarasin had raised this with the King about eight years ago, according to Siddhi, and the King had agreed, authorizing Arsa to talk to royal family members and to set up new rules limiting entourages and occasions when traffic would be stopped. Nothing had changed; Siddhi noted that he had been caught up in traffic for 45 minutes the previous week returning for a meeting with the Chinese Ambassador, due to a royal motorcade. Stories that the Crown Prince now ordered second story windows closed as his motorcade passed achieved nothing but additional popular resentment, Siddhi added sorrowfully. Thaksin and Hun Sen ------------------- ¶13. (C) Thaksin clearly remained on the mind of all three “establishment” figures. Former PM Anand asserted that the King’s health and mood remained poor “primarily because of Thaksin” and the challenge Thaksin posed to the stability of the country. GEN Prem asked Ambassador what the U.S. would do in the situation Thailand found itself, with a neighboring country appointing as an adviser a former leader bent on bringing down the government. Ambassador replied that while former U.S. Presidents did occasionally give paid speeches overseas, they would never work for another government; he advised Prem and Thai officials to take the high road in their public comments about Cambodia, and not to be drawn into a tit for tat with Thaksin and Hun Sen. (Note: Prem seemed to be musing out loud, but he clearly was focused on what he perceived as a threat from Thaksin and Hun Sen’s facilitation of Thaksin’s efforts). ¶14. (C) ACM Siddhi said that PM Abhisit had called him on his 90th birthday recently and had indicated that now that Thailand was no longer ASEAN Chair, Abhisit would feel less constrained in responding to Hun Sen’s bullying rhetoric more freely. Siddhi expressed concern that in addition to Cambodia and Brunei, clearly in Thaksin’s camp due to his close personal ties with Hun Sen and the Brunei Sultan, Laos and Vietnam might back Hun Sen in the ongoing Thai-Cambodia diplomatic spat. ¶15. (C) ACM Siddhi attacked Thaksin as trying to use money, red-shirt protests, and Hun Sen to “destroy our country,” but he predicted Thaksin would not succeed. Thaksin never had tried to negotiate, Siddhi alleged, but only issued demands; had he been willing to come back and spend a nominal time in jail for his conviction, Thaksin likely would have been quickly pardoned/released as a former PM. Now Thaksin would try to create chaos, possibly sparking the use of force. While Siddhi expected Thaksin to lose the February 26 decision on his 76 billion baht ($2.3 billion) in frozen assets, he claimed his sources indicated Thaksin still had 240 billion baht ($7.3 billion) overseas. Rather than live overseas quietly, Thaksin had decided to fight, funding websites attacking the King and Queen to stir up anti-monarchy views. JOHN 222059 8/24/2009 20:37 09STATE88226 Secretary of State UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 09BANGKOK1998 VZCZCXYZ0013 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #8226 2362055 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 242037Z AUG 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 0000 INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 0000 UNCLAS STATE 088226 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KCRM, PTER, CO, RS, TH SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT ON VIKTOR BOUT REF: BANGKOK 1998 1. (SBU) This is an action request for Bogota. Embassy is requested to urge the Government of Colombia at the highest levels to weigh-in with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to support the extradition of accused arms smuggler Viktor Bout to the United States. Post may draw from the points in para 4 but should not leave them behind as a non-paper. 2. (SBU) Background: Viktor Bout was arrested in Thailand in March 2008, where he has remained in custody pending resolution of a request for extradition to the United States to face trial in New York for conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals and officers; acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles; and provide material support in the form of millions of dollars of military-grade weapons to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a designated foreign terrorist organization. Until his arrest in Thailand, Bout had not been prosecuted for arms dealing, but has long been suspected of trafficking arms to central and western Africa and is the subject of UN Sanctions for those activities. 3. (SBU) On August 11, 2009, a Thai judge denied the U.S. extradition request on the grounds, among others, that the FARC is a political, rather than terrorist, organization, and that its commission of kidnappings and murders constituted protected "political offenses" because the FARC had a purported purpose of political change in Colombia. The judge also ruled that he did not find it credible that Bout, perhaps the most notorious illicit arms trafficker in the world, could supply the quantity and type of weapons about which he was negotiating when he was arrested in Thailand. The Thai Attorney General's office is appealing the ruling, and we are requesting that the Government of Colombia as well as the governments of other countries affected by Bout's arms smuggling network engage the Royal Thai Government (RTG) directly to underscore the significance of this case to the larger international community and help ensure that the RTG provides full support for the appeal. 4. (SBU) Begin points for Bogota: -- The United States is pursuing the extradition of the notorious arms dealer Viktor Bout from Thailand to face charges for conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals and officers; acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles; and provide material support to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a designated foreign terrorist organization. -- The RTG supports Bout's extradition, but a Thai judge ruled against the request, asserting among other things that the FARC is a political, rather than terrorist, organization. The judge also maintained that the evidence against Bout was not credible, and called into question Bout's capacity to provide large amounts of weapons and munitions. -- We request that the Government of Colombia (GOC) weigh-in with the Royal Thai Government at the highest level to underscore that the FARC is a terrorist organization and not a legitimate political movement and the group's campaign of murder, kidnapping and extortion cannot be excused by its purported political motives. -- We understand that the GOC may not have a formal mechanism for listing the FARC as an official terrorist organization as both the U.S. and the EU have done, but GOC officials frequently use "terrorist" and "narco-terrorist" to describe the FARC and its leadership. We urge that you convey to the RTG that the GOC considers the FARC to be a terrorist organization. -- We have urged the RTG to issue a statement making clear its own disappointment with the judge's ruling and reaffirming its commitment to the fight against international terrorism. It would be helpful if the GOC could deliver a similar message to the RTG at the level of Prime Minister or Foreign Minister. End points. 5. (U) Point of contact for this issue is EAP/MLS Demian Smith, email smithd3@state.gov, phone: 202-647-0036. Please slug any responses for EAP/MLS, EUR/RUS, WHA/AND, S/CT. Department requests action by Tuesday, August 25. CLINTON 216232 7/13/2009 7:18 09BANGKOK1662 Embassy Bangkok CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO5366 OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHBK #1662/01 1940718 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 130718Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7485 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1752 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7257 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5624 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9809 RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 6806 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001662 SIPDIS FROM THE AMBASSADOR STATE FOR THE SECRETARY ALSO FOR EAP A/S CAMPBELL, NSC FOR BADER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2019 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TH SUBJECT: THAILAND SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S JULY 21-23 VISIT BANGKOK 00001662 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d) 1. (C) Madam Secretary: You will arrive July 21 in a Kingdom of Thailand divided politically and focused inward, uncertain about the country's future after revered but ailing 81 year old King Bhumibol eventually passes. Despite a deep and broad alliance partnership that continues to deliver significant benefits quietly to both sides, the immediate priorities of the U.S. and Thailand overlap less than in years past; yours will be the first Secretary of State visit to Thailand in four years, since July 2005. The meetings with PM Abhisit in Bangkok and FM Kasit in Phuket offer an opportunity to thank the Thai for our productive alliance partnership, for Thai facilitation of shared military, law enforcement, and intelligence efforts, as well as groundbreaking health/research collaboration and long-standing refugee support, and to express our support for Thailand's democracy to meet its current challenges and emerge strengthened. Temporary Calm in a Troubled Kingdom ------------------------------------ 2. (C) The past year has been a turbulent one in Thailand. Court decisions forced two Prime Ministers from office, and twice the normal patterns of political life took a back seat to disruptive protests in the streets. The yellow-shirted People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) occupied Government House from August to December 2008, shutting down Bangkok's airports for eight days in late November, to protest governments affiliated with ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The red-shirted United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), followers of Thaksin, disrupted a regional Asian Summit and sparked riots in Bangkok in mid-April after Thaksin, now a fugitive abroad in the wake of an abuse of power conviction, called for a revolution to bring him home. While both yellow and red try to lay exclusive claim to the mantle of democracy, neither is truly democratic in intent or tactics. 3. (C) The current PM, Abhisit Vejjajiva, is a photogenic, eloquent 44-year old Oxford graduate who generally has progressive instincts and says the right things about basic freedoms, social inequities, policy towards Burma, and how to address the troubled deep south, afflicted by a grinding ethno-nationalist Muslim-Malay separatist insurgency. Whether Abhisit can deliver change is another matter. He is beset with a fractious coalition, with partners more interested in self-enrichment than good governance, as well as a resurgent post-2006 coup military not interested in political compromises in the deep south or reducing its profile, at least as long as uncertainty over a looming royal succession crisis remains to be resolved. 4. (C) While Thailand in 2009 has been more stable than in 2008, mid-April red riots aside, it is the calm in the eye of a storm. Few observers believe that the deep political and social divides can be bridged until after King Bhumibol passes and Thailand's tectonic plates shift. Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn neither commands the respect nor displays the charisma of his beloved father, who greatly expanded the prestige and influence of the monarchy during his 62 year reign. Some question whether Vajiralongkorn will be crowned King, as Bhumibol desires. Nearly everyone expects the monarchy to shrink and change in function after succession. How much will change is open to question, with many institutions, figures, and political forces positioning for influence, not only over redefining the institution of monarchy but, equally fundamentally, what it means to be Thai. It is a heady time for observers of the Thai scene, a frightening one for normal Thai. Engaging a long-term ally and friend strategically --------------------------------------------- ----- 5. (C) Both major parties in Thai politics -- the ruling Democrats and the opposition, Thaksin-affiliated Puea Thai 208273 5/22/2009 9:55 09BANGKOK1253 Embassy Bangkok UNCLASSIFIED VZCZCXYZ0003 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHBK #1253/01 1420955 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 220955Z MAY 09 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7093 INFO RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE UNCLAS BANGKOK 001253 SIPDIS STATE FOR L/DL JUSTICE FOR OFL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KLIG, TH SUBJECT: CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AGAINST DEA EMPLOYEES 1. (SBU) Pursuant to reftel, this will advise that Embassy Bangkok has received notice of legal proceedings in Thailand naming as defendants the following three employees from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration: Special Agent Derek S. Odney; Special Agent Scott Seeley-Hacker; and Special Agent Robert Zachariasiewicz. Special Agents Odney and Seeley-Hacker are, and were at all relevant times, accredited to Post as A/T staff. Special Agent Zachariasiewicz is assigned to the DEA's Special Operations Division in Washington, D.C., and is not, and has never been, accredited to Post. 2. (SBU) The legal proceedings have been initiated by a criminal complaint filed by plaintiff Viktor Bout in Southern Bangkok Criminal Court, entitled Criminal Litigation Between Mr. Victor Analojevich Bout, Plaintiff, and Mr. Derek S. Odney, Defendant No. 1; Mr. Robert Zachariasiewicz, Defendant No. 2; and Mr. Scott Hacker, Defendant No. 3, Case No. 1050/2552. The Southern Bangkok Criminal Court is located at Rachini Road, Phra Nakorn, Bangkok. 3. (SBU) Bout's complaint alleges that the three DEA employees violated various provisions of Thai law in connection with the investigation and arrest of Bout on terrorism charges in Bangkok in March 2008. In particular, the complaint alleges that the DEA employees made false statements to the Thai authorities leading to his arrest; illegally installed recording devices in the hotel room where Bout was arrested; and forced Bout at gun point to surrender to the Thai authorities. 4. (SBU) The Embassy received notice of the legal proceedings directly from the Southern Bangkok Criminal Court via express mail on May 20, 2009, in three envelopes individually addressed to the three DEA employees. On May 19, the Embassy had also obtained a copy of the criminal complaint from a prosecutor from the Office of the Attorney General, who had been provided a copy by Bout's defense counsel during an extradition hearing that same day at the Thai Criminal Court. 5. (SBU) The mailing received from the Southern Bangkok Criminal Court on May 20 included the following: the criminal complaint and four attached exhibits; a notice of an optional "mediation session" scheduled to be held at the court's Dispute Mediation Center on June 30, 2009 at 1:30 p.m.; a summons to appear either personally or through a legal representative at a Preliminary Hearing on July 13, 2009 at 1:30 p.m.; and a List of Witnesses, which names Bout, his defense lawyer, an officer from the Royal Thai Police and a prosecutor from the Office of the Attorney General. The mediation notice states that the parties are "required to notify the Court of [their] mediation intention" by contacting staff of the Dispute Mediation Center by telephone or mail. These documents were in Thai and are in the process of being translated at Post. 6. (SBU) Bout is currently in custody at Bangkok Remand Prison in Bangkok for purposes of extradition to the U.S. to face trial for conspiring to sell weapons to the FARC for use in killing Americans in Colombia. The indictment pending against Bout in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York charges him with four terrorism offenses: conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals; conspiracy to kill U.S. officers or employees; conspiracy to acquire and use an anti-aircraft missile; and conspiracy to provide material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. 7. (SBU) The Royal Thai Police initially arrested Bout at the Sofitel Hotel in Bangkok on March 6, 2008 on Thai terrorism charges. On April 9, 2008, the Thai authorities dropped the Thai charges in favor of the U.S. prosecution and detained Bout on a provisional arrest warrant issued by the Thai Criminal Court in the extradition case. The U.S. formally submitted its extradition request to the Thai authorities on May 6, 2008. 8. (SBU) The DEA and Royal Thai Police closely coordinated Bout's investigation and arrest. Any and all investigative activities performed by DEA agents in Thailand in this matter, including those of the three agents Bout has sued, were performed in concert with, and with the knowledge and approval of, the Royal Thai Police. 9. (SBU) Thailand's Office of the Attorney General is prosecuting the extradition case against Bout on behalf of the United States. In October 2008, the Thai prosecutors completed their presentation of its extradition case, which included testimony from DEA Special Agent Zachariasiewicz, a Royal Thai Police officer, and officials from the Foreign and Interior Ministries. Special Agent Zachariasiewicz's testimony, among other things, described the close cooperation between the DEA and Thai authorities in the investigation and arrest of Bout. In over a dozen extradition hearings since that time, Bout's lawyers have sought to present evidence supporting his defense that the U.S. prosecution is politically motivated and that the extradition request violates the Extradition Treaty and Thai law. 10. (SBU) At an extradition hearing on May 19, 2009, the Thai Criminal Court ordered closing statements in the extradition case against Bout to be filed no later than June 30, 2009, and announced that a verdict in the matter would be delivered on August 11, 2009. 11. (SBU) Department of Justice Attach Christopher P. Sonderby has been involved in the Bout investigation and extradition since its inception and is knowledgeable about the facts relating to the attempted service of the criminal complaint and the facts of the case. Mr. Sonderby's contact information is as follows: Christopher P. Sonderby 12. (SBU) Post will not take any action regarding these legal proceedings unless and until it receives instructions to do so. JOHN BANGKOK 00001662 002.2 OF 003 (For Thai) party -- are favorable towards the U.S.; in fact, there are no radical, non-middle of the road parties represented in the Thai parliament. On the domestic political front, you should emphasize our hope that all sides will work out differences within the democratic framework and without resort to violence, as well as our support for long-time friend Thailand to work through its current difficulties and emerge as a more participatory democracy. 6. (C) If there is one area of policy difference between Thai parties affecting U.S. interests, it may well be certain elements of foreign policy. PM Abhisit and FM Kasit have stated that Thailand's foreign policy should reflect that it is a democracy, rather than being reduced to mere commercial interests of cabinet members, as they claim pro-Thaksin governments did; Thailand's Burma policy has shifted noticeably since Abhisit/Kasit came to office last December. Both Abhisit and Kasit are eager to avoid transactional diplomacy and engage you strategically, building on your meeting with Kasit in Washington in April and commitment to reanimating our Strategic Dialogue. 7. (C) The North Korea challenge via implementation of UNSCR 1874 and Burma policy in the wake of UN SYG Ban's visit, Aung San Suu Kyi's trial, and recent fighting which led to the greatest cross-border refugee flows into Thailand in a decade are key foreign policy issues to raise with Abhisit and Kasit, particularly given Thailand's current role as ASEAN Chair. The rise of China, and the perceived absence of a focused U.S. presence in the region in recent years, is another strategic issue worth addressing; Thailand does not seek to choose between the U.S. and China, prefers to have good relations with both, and wishes the U.S. to be engaged in the region. 8. (C) There are several bilateral concerns worth raising. On refugees, Thailand continues to host more than 140,000 Burmese and facilitate resettlement of more than 17,000 refugees to the U.S. this year, for which we are grateful, but it has been much less helpful on a small group of Lao Hmong, which has drawn Congressional attention. Thai authorities facilitated the arrest of notorious Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout in March 2008; we await the results of the extradition hearing August 11. U.S. firms still receive preferred national treatment in a number of sectors, bolstering a strong trade and investment relationship, but Thai officials need to do more to strengthen the investment climate, particularly on Customs reform and intellectual property rights enforcement. Enduring value from the relationship ------------------------------------ 9. (C) Regional operational platform: The U.S. mission in Thailand is one of the largest and most diverse in the world - with over 2000 employees representing nearly 40 different departments and agencies - for good reason: we can accomplish a tremendous amount in Thailand, not only bilaterally but as a regional platform, often in ways that would be almost impossible to replicate elsewhere. That operational success occurs routinely, without fanfare or headlines, and perhaps is undervalued as a result; it would also be fair to say that we probably derive more from the relationship at present than the Thai do. More than half of the mission's employees work regionally, not bilaterally, and Bangkok's role as a regional operational, assistance, financial/IT support, and training hub for the USG will continue to expand in the coming years. 10. (SBU) Health/disease research: With approximately 400 Mission staff working on health issues, the Embassy hosts one of the USG's largest efforts to fight the world's most dangerous diseases: malaria; TB; dengue; HIV/AIDS; and pandemic influenza. CDC, USAID, USDA/APHIS, and the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences (AFRIMS) collaborate with Thai counterparts on basic research and trial vaccines, and are platforms for assistance throughout the region. The sophistication of the Thai scientific and BANGKOK 00001662 003.2 OF 003 public health community makes collaboration as useful to the USG as it is to the Thais. A number of important breakthroughs, such as in the prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission from mothers to children, were developed here, and several phase III, double blind trials for potential HIV vaccines are currently ongoing. 11. (C) Mil-Mil ties: As one of five U.S. treaty allies in Asia and straddling a major force projection air/sea corridor, Thailand is crucial to U.S. security interests well beyond Southeast Asia. Our bilateral military relationship provides distinctive force projection opportunities from Thai military facilities amid vital sea and air lanes that support combat and humanitarian assistance missions, the opportunity to conduct live fire training exercises, both bilateral and multilateral, that are impossible to match elsewhere in Asia. We access the Utapao Naval Air Field alone a 1000 times a year; had the North Korean ship Kang Nam 1 continued on to Burma rather than turning around, we would have staged P-3s to Utapao to track it. Preserving such unfettered, unquestioned access requires engagement and remains a mission and USG priority. 12. (SBU) Law enforcement: 40 years of law enforcement cooperation initially focused on counter-narcotics efforts has expanded to all aspects of transnational crime, defending U.S. interests and securing extraditions of both U.S. citizens and third country nationals, and building capacity in the Thai criminal justice system. Eighteen federal and local law enforcement agencies are currently represented in the Embassy. The U.S. and Thailand co-host the International Law Enforcement Academy, a regional platform to promote law enforcement professionalism. The extradition case of Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout, wanted in New York on charges of conspiring to provide arms to terrorists, is our current law enforcement top priority. JOHN
195368 3/5/2009 10:00 09BANGKOK567 Embassy Bangkok SECRET 09BANGKOK385 VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHBK #0567/01 0641000 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 051000Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6290 INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1606 RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 5413 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY S E C R E T BANGKOK 000567 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2019 TAGS: PTER, PREL, PARM, PGOV, ECON, KCRM, KJUS, TH, RU SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES DEPUTY PM SUTHEP ON VIKTOR BOUT EXTRADITION, DISCUSSES THAI POLITICAL SITUATION REF: BANGKOK 385 (ENGAGING PM ON BOUT) Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (S) Summary: The Ambassador on March 4 pressed Thai Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban to ensure retraction or rebuttal of false court testimony in the extradition proceedings of Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout, which resume March 6. Suthep said Prime Minister Abhisit had previously discussed the matter with him, and he would investigate and take appropriate action. On Thai politics, Suthep said the Thai public expected Abhisit to steer Thailand through the global economic crisis, even though many factors were outside of Abhisit's control. He cautioned against underestimating the influence of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Suthep briefly discussed RTG counterinsurgency efforts in southern Thailand, and the Ambassador said he hoped for a breakthrough in the case of missing lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit. 2. (S) Comment: Suthep clearly was familiar with the Bout case and understands it is a top priority for the USG. Separately, an official close to Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn assured us that the Crown Prince's associates had no connection with Bout and his team. Nevertheless, we have not yet seen that high-level RTG officials are prepared to engage actively with prosecutors to assure the highest possible probability of Bout's extradition. We will continue monitoring the extradition proceedings and pressing for a speedy and proper outcome. End Summary and Comment. VIKTOR BOUT ----------- 3. (SBU) The Ambassador, accompanied by Poloff, called on Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban at Government House on March 4. As Deputy PM, Suthep is responsible for all security-related agencies, including the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Justice; the Royal Thai Police; the National Security Council; and the National Intelligence Agency. Additionally, Suthep serves as Secretary General of the Democrat Party, and he has long worked closely with DP Leader (now Prime Minister) Abhisit Vejjajiva. 4. (S) Following opening pleasantries, the Ambassador said he wanted to raise the "critical" issue of Viktor Bout's extradition. This case was extremely important to the U.S. President Bush had raised it with Prime Minister Samak during an August 2008 visit, and it remained important for President Obama. Hours earlier, U.S. Attorney General Holder had discussed the case over the telephone with his Thai counterpart, the Ambassador explained. 5. (S) The Ambassador acknowledged that the extradition case had to move through Thai legal processes, but the U.S. was concerned that there had been "serious problems" in those processes, as the Ambassador had explained recently to PM Abhisit (reftel). Bout and his lawyers were using non-legal means to attempt to influence the outcome of the case, and one result was the false testimony of a Royal Thai Navy (RTN) officer, who had indicated in court in late December that Bout had come to Thailand on a quasi-official mission (reftel). 6. (S) DPM Suthep said Abhisit had discussed the matter with him, as well as with the Defense Minister. Abhisit had stressed the USG interest in Bout's extradition, and the RTG had no interest in obstructing this. Suthep pledged to investigate the RTN official's actions, and whether he had testified in court in an official or private capacity. The Ambassador emphasized that, given the false testimony from an RTN official, it would be most appropriate for a higher-ranking RTN official to explain in court proceedings that Bout had not/not come to Thailand on a quasi-official mission. The Ambassador reiterated the critical nature of this case, emphasizing the lethal threat Bout had posed to the safety of American citizens. He added that a DOJ prosecutor was working at the Embassy and would be pleased to work more extensively with the Thais on this matter. Suthep reiterated his willingness in principle to assist and said he would welcome whatever information we could provide. 7. (S) Separately, Niphon Promphan (Secretary General to the Prime Minister and a close associate of the Crown Prince) told us that he had met on March 2 with the Secretary to Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, Air Chief Marshall Satitpong Sukvimol, and had relayed our concern that Bout would receive assistance from the Crown Prince's office (reftel). Niphon told us that Satitpong denied that he or others in the Crown Prince's entourage had any association with Bout. Satitpong said he would use his resources to investigate this false claim of ties to the Palace. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE ECONOMY --------------------------------- 8. (C) Following their discussion of legal matters, the Ambassador asked Suthep's view of the domestic political situation. Suthep said he was not worried about the possibility of a no-confidence debate in the parliament. Rather, he was more concerned about efforts by "redshirt" activists allied with former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to stir up popular sentiment against the government. Suthep said it was important not to underestimate Thaksin, who would not easily surrender and retained extensive financial resources. To address the populace's concerns, the RTG was sending cabinet Ministers to travel around the country and meet with both officials and the general public. 9. (C) Suthep said the Thai people expected Abhisit to steer Thailand through the current economic crisis. This was difficult for the administration, because the crisis was global and beyond Thailand's control. Suthep said he believed Thailand's extensive rural economy made the country less vulnerable than some others, but it would likely be necessary to follow up on the government's first stimulus program with subsequent efforts. The Ambassador noted that American corporations remained interested in making significant investments in Thailand, which, despite recent political turmoil, remained an appealing place for business. THE SOUTH, COUNTERNARCOTICS --------------------------- 10. (C) Noting that he bore special responsibilities for the security environment in southern Thailand, Suthep said he could assure the Ambassador that the RTG would adhere to the rule of law, and would not engage in extra-judicial killings. The Ambassador welcomed that assurance and said he hoped that the latest efforts to resolve the fate of missing lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit would succeed (note: Somchai disappeared March 12, 2004. End note). Suthep said he, too, was hopeful, although it was difficult to obtain new evidence in that case. 11. (C) Suthep explained that the RTG had formed a subgroup of the cabinet (including the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Education, and Health) to focus on the South, and it was devising a five-year plan to improve the quality of life for southerners. The Ambassador assured Suthep that the USG hoped these efforts would succeed, but we understood any direct U.S. involvement in the border provinces could backfire to the RTG's detriment. Suthep agreed with the Ambassador and remarked tangentially that he and others in the RTG were focusing on counternarcotics efforts and would welcome further cooperation with the USG in that field. ASEAN SUMMIT ------------ 12. (C) The Ambassador also congratulated Suthep on the RTG's successful hosting of the recent ASEAN Summit. The Ambassador explained that, in the run-up to the Summit, the Embassy's Regional Security Office had trained dozens of officials from the Police Special Branch in VIP protection methods. Suthep expressed his gratitude for this training. JOHN VZCZCXRO6557 PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHBK #0192/01 0250759 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 250759Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9667 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2258 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7904 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 6126 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0330 RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 7534 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY Monday, 25 January 2010, 07:59 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000192 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON EO 12958 DECL: 01/25/2030 TAGS PREL, PGOV, TH SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PRIVY COUNCIL CHAIR PREM, OTHER “ESTABLISHMENT” FIGURES ON YEAR AHEAD REF: BANGKOK 184 (SEH DAENG) BANGKOK 00000192 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador paid a series of New Year’s- related calls on influential Thai figures, including Privy Council Chair GEN Prem, Privy Council member ACM Siddhi, and former PM Anand, to discuss the year ahead. Abhisit’s performance, issues related to the royal family, and challenges posed by Thaksin/Hun Sen emerged as the primary themes. Prem offered a more positive assessment of Abhisit’s performance than Siddhi, who criticized Abhisit for a lack of resolve and the absence of an effective team to carry out his policies. All three focused on the challenge posed by Thaksin to the government and, indirectly, to the monarchy; Anand attributed part of the King’s poor health to Thaksin, and both Prem and Siddhi were upset about Thaksin’s alliance of convenience with Cambodian leader Hun Sen. All three had quite negative comments about Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn. While asserting that the Crown Prince will become King, both Siddhi and Anand implied the country would be better off if other arrangements could be made. Siddhi expressed preference for Princess Sirindhorn; Anand suggested only the King would be in a position to change succession, and acknowledged a low likelihood of that happening. ¶2. (S) Comment: On the two most difficult and sensitive issues of the day in Thailand -- Thaksin and the monarchy -- the Thai elite appear as unsure about the future as any other sector of society. The stakes are significant for all sides, and resolution of the political divide and royal succession could still be far over the horizon. Elite concerns about Abhisit in office appear to reflect less on his performance than on general worries about the ultimate resolution of issues. End Summary and Comment. Mixed Views on Abhisit’s performance ------------------------------------ ¶3. (C) Privy Councilor Chair GEN Prem shared his assessments of PM Abhisit, the Crown Prince’s relationship with Thaksin, and difficulties dealing with Cambodia/Hun Sen with Ambassador over lunch January 13. Regarding Abhisit, Prem referenced widespread criticism that the PM was too young and not strong enough to be an effective leader in trying times. However, Prem felt that Abhisit had proved in 2009 that he was up to the challenge of doing what was necessary to run a fractious coalition government, no easy task. In addition, there were no other politicians available who were more principled and had more integrity than Abhisit, and Thailand needed such a leader at this point. Prem expressed hope that Thais and foreigners alike would be more patient with Abhisit, who he believed was the right man to serve as premier. ¶4. (C) Fellow Privy Councilor ACM Siddhi, hosting Ambassador at his home January 11, was more critical of Abhisit than Prem. Siddhi said that he had told Abhisit’s father, his own long-time personal physician, that his son needed to be more decisive and “make more friends” in 2010. Abhisit spent too much time at the podium and not enough time assembling an effective team to which he could delegate action and rely on for well-thought out policy initiatives, in Siddhi’s view. Abhisit also needed to get out to engage the grassroots, one of Thaksin’s strengths. On Siddhi’s wish list: Abhisit pushing through a permanent appointment for Acting Police Chief Pratheep; using his power over wayward coalition parties by threatening parliamentary dissolution if they did not get in line; and telling the Army to take action to dismiss renegade MGEN Khattiya, even if Defense Minister Prawit refused to sign a dismissal order. Political Year Ahead -------------------- ¶5. (C) While GEN Prem expressed moderate concern about the potential for violence and political discord in early 2010, he felt the situation was no worse than six months ago. Prem asked about U.S. laws regarding demonstrations and avoiding BANGKOK 00000192 002.2 OF 003 excessive disruptions of government functions and daily lives of citizens; Ambassador explained the U.S. system of permits for protests which allowed for free speech but not free access everywhere. Ambassador shared U.S. frustration about decisions negatively affecting economic/investment climate, such as Ma Tha Phut and the digital lottery cancellation; the uneven application of the rule of law, breaches of contract, and regulatory shifts affected the investment climate more negatively at this point than political turmoil. ¶6. (C) ACM Siddhi expressed more concerns than Prem about the security situation in 2010, suggesting that Army Commander Anupong’s inability to control wayward red-affiliated MGEN Khattiya’s M-79 attacks on yellow-shirt rallies and trips to see Thaksin overseas was not a good harbinger (note: three days later, someone attacked Anupong’s office at night with an M-79, with Khattiya widely seen as the likely suspect, see reftel. End note). Siddhi said he had higher hopes for deputy Commander Prayuth, widely expected to replace Anupong in October and seen as particularly close to the Queen. Siddhi claimed Prem had sent a signal of his displeasure with Anupong by snubbing him during a group call at Prem’s residence to pass birthday greetings, not stopping to talk to Anupong personally as he did with other key military commanders. Royal Family: King, Crown Prince, Entourages -------------------------------------------- ¶7. (S) Regarding King Bhumibol’s health, Prem indicated that the King was exercising 30 minutes a day on a stationary bicycle at Siriraj Hospital and passing a medicine ball with a physical therapist to build up strength and regain weight. Prem acknowledged that he had not seen the King since the hospitalization, but that the Queen and Princess Sirindhorn saw the King daily. When Ambassador asked about the Crown Prince’s involvement, Prem repeated: the Queen and Sirindhorn visit him daily. ¶8. (S) Prem acknowledged Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn probably maintained some sort of relationship with fugitive former PM Thaksin, “seeing him from time to time.” Prem, clearly no fan of either man, cautioned that Thaksin ran the risk of self-delusion if he thought that the Crown Prince would act as his friend/supporter in the future merely because of Thaksin’s monetary support; “he does not enjoy that sort of relationship.” When Ambassador asked where the Crown Prince was currently, in Thailand or Europe, Prem replied dismissively: “You know his social life, how he is.” (Note: a presumed reference to Vajiralongkorn’s preference to spend time based out of Munich with his main mistress, rather than in Thailand with his wife and son). ¶9. (S) ACM Siddhi, in a similar vein, noted that the Crown Prince frequently slipped away from Thailand, and that information about his air hostess mistresses was widely available on websites; he lamented how his former aide, now Thai Ambassador to Germany, was forced to leave Berlin for Munich often to receive Vajiralongkorn. Siddhi raised Thaksin’s controversial November Times On-line interview, which Siddhi claimed cast the King in a bad light and attempted to praise the Crown Prince as broad-minded and educated abroad, hinting that Vajiralongkorn would be ready to welcome Thaksin back to Thailand once he became King. ¶10. (S) Ambassador mentioned to Siddhi the Crown Prince’s more engaging approach in the early December King’s Birthday reception with Ambassadors, shaking each envoy’s hand and appearing more at ease than in the 2008 reception. Siddhi stated that succession would be a difficult transition time for Thailand. According to Palace Law, the Crown Prince would succeed his father, but added after a pause, almost hopefully: “if the Crown Prince were to die, anything could happen, and maybe Prathep (Sirindhorn) could succeed.” ¶11. (S) Ambassador similarly raised the Crown Prince’s more confident demeanor with former PM Anand in late December, seeking Anand’s assessment of the dynamics in play as succession inevitably drew nearer. Anand’s response was BANGKOK 00000192 003.2 OF 003 similar to Siddhi’s, but more detailed and blunt. Anand said that he had always believed that the Crown Prince would succeed his father, according to law. However, there could be complicating factors -- if Vajiralongkohn proved unable to stay out of politics, or avoid embarrassing financial transactions. After a pause, Anand added that the consensus view among many Thai was that the Crown Prince could not stop either, nor would he be able, at age 57, to rectify his behavior. After another pause, Anand added that someone really should raise the matter with the King, before adding with regret that there really was no one who could raise such a delicate topic (note: implied was the need for an alternative to Vajiralongkorn). ¶12. (S) ACM Siddhi expressed his personal concern about the declining image of the royal family in Thailand, noting that something as simple as excessive motorcade-related traffic jams caused by minor royals was an unnecessary but enduring irritant. Personal Private Secretary Arsa Sarasin had raised this with the King about eight years ago, according to Siddhi, and the King had agreed, authorizing Arsa to talk to royal family members and to set up new rules limiting entourages and occasions when traffic would be stopped. Nothing had changed; Siddhi noted that he had been caught up in traffic for 45 minutes the previous week returning for a meeting with the Chinese Ambassador, due to a royal motorcade. Stories that the Crown Prince now ordered second story windows closed as his motorcade passed achieved nothing but additional popular resentment, Siddhi added sorrowfully. Thaksin and Hun Sen ------------------- ¶13. (C) Thaksin clearly remained on the mind of all three “establishment” figures. Former PM Anand asserted that the King’s health and mood remained poor “primarily because of Thaksin” and the challenge Thaksin posed to the stability of the country. GEN Prem asked Ambassador what the U.S. would do in the situation Thailand found itself, with a neighboring country appointing as an adviser a former leader bent on bringing down the government. Ambassador replied that while former U.S. Presidents did occasionally give paid speeches overseas, they would never work for another government; he advised Prem and Thai officials to take the high road in their public comments about Cambodia, and not to be drawn into a tit for tat with Thaksin and Hun Sen. (Note: Prem seemed to be musing out loud, but he clearly was focused on what he perceived as a threat from Thaksin and Hun Sen’s facilitation of Thaksin’s efforts). ¶14. (C) ACM Siddhi said that PM Abhisit had called him on his 90th birthday recently and had indicated that now that Thailand was no longer ASEAN Chair, Abhisit would feel less constrained in responding to Hun Sen’s bullying rhetoric more freely. Siddhi expressed concern that in addition to Cambodia and Brunei, clearly in Thaksin’s camp due to his close personal ties with Hun Sen and the Brunei Sultan, Laos and Vietnam might back Hun Sen in the ongoing Thai-Cambodia diplomatic spat. ¶15. (C) ACM Siddhi attacked Thaksin as trying to use money, red-shirt protests, and Hun Sen to “destroy our country,” but he predicted Thaksin would not succeed. Thaksin never had tried to negotiate, Siddhi alleged, but only issued demands; had he been willing to come back and spend a nominal time in jail for his conviction, Thaksin likely would have been quickly pardoned/released as a former PM. Now Thaksin would try to create chaos, possibly sparking the use of force. While Siddhi expected Thaksin to lose the February 26 decision on his 76 billion baht ($2.3 billion) in frozen assets, he claimed his sources indicated Thaksin still had 240 billion baht ($7.3 billion) overseas. Rather than live overseas quietly, Thaksin had decided to fight, funding websites attacking the King and Queen to stir up anti-monarchy views. JOHN 222059 8/24/2009 20:37 09STATE88226 Secretary of State UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 09BANGKOK1998 VZCZCXYZ0013 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #8226 2362055 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 242037Z AUG 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 0000 INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA IMMEDIATE 0000 UNCLAS STATE 088226 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KCRM, PTER, CO, RS, TH SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT ON VIKTOR BOUT REF: BANGKOK 1998 1. (SBU) This is an action request for Bogota. Embassy is requested to urge the Government of Colombia at the highest levels to weigh-in with the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to support the extradition of accused arms smuggler Viktor Bout to the United States. Post may draw from the points in para 4 but should not leave them behind as a non-paper. 2. (SBU) Background: Viktor Bout was arrested in Thailand in March 2008, where he has remained in custody pending resolution of a request for extradition to the United States to face trial in New York for conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals and officers; acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles; and provide material support in the form of millions of dollars of military-grade weapons to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a designated foreign terrorist organization. Until his arrest in Thailand, Bout had not been prosecuted for arms dealing, but has long been suspected of trafficking arms to central and western Africa and is the subject of UN Sanctions for those activities. 3. (SBU) On August 11, 2009, a Thai judge denied the U.S. extradition request on the grounds, among others, that the FARC is a political, rather than terrorist, organization, and that its commission of kidnappings and murders constituted protected "political offenses" because the FARC had a purported purpose of political change in Colombia. The judge also ruled that he did not find it credible that Bout, perhaps the most notorious illicit arms trafficker in the world, could supply the quantity and type of weapons about which he was negotiating when he was arrested in Thailand. The Thai Attorney General's office is appealing the ruling, and we are requesting that the Government of Colombia as well as the governments of other countries affected by Bout's arms smuggling network engage the Royal Thai Government (RTG) directly to underscore the significance of this case to the larger international community and help ensure that the RTG provides full support for the appeal. 4. (SBU) Begin points for Bogota: -- The United States is pursuing the extradition of the notorious arms dealer Viktor Bout from Thailand to face charges for conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals and officers; acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles; and provide material support to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a designated foreign terrorist organization. -- The RTG supports Bout's extradition, but a Thai judge ruled against the request, asserting among other things that the FARC is a political, rather than terrorist, organization. The judge also maintained that the evidence against Bout was not credible, and called into question Bout's capacity to provide large amounts of weapons and munitions. -- We request that the Government of Colombia (GOC) weigh-in with the Royal Thai Government at the highest level to underscore that the FARC is a terrorist organization and not a legitimate political movement and the group's campaign of murder, kidnapping and extortion cannot be excused by its purported political motives. -- We understand that the GOC may not have a formal mechanism for listing the FARC as an official terrorist organization as both the U.S. and the EU have done, but GOC officials frequently use "terrorist" and "narco-terrorist" to describe the FARC and its leadership. We urge that you convey to the RTG that the GOC considers the FARC to be a terrorist organization. -- We have urged the RTG to issue a statement making clear its own disappointment with the judge's ruling and reaffirming its commitment to the fight against international terrorism. It would be helpful if the GOC could deliver a similar message to the RTG at the level of Prime Minister or Foreign Minister. End points. 5. (U) Point of contact for this issue is EAP/MLS Demian Smith, email smithd3@state.gov, phone: 202-647-0036. Please slug any responses for EAP/MLS, EUR/RUS, WHA/AND, S/CT. Department requests action by Tuesday, August 25. CLINTON 216232 7/13/2009 7:18 09BANGKOK1662 Embassy Bangkok CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO5366 OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHBK #1662/01 1940718 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 130718Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7485 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1752 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7257 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5624 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9809 RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 6806 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001662 SIPDIS FROM THE AMBASSADOR STATE FOR THE SECRETARY ALSO FOR EAP A/S CAMPBELL, NSC FOR BADER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2019 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TH SUBJECT: THAILAND SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S JULY 21-23 VISIT BANGKOK 00001662 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d) 1. (C) Madam Secretary: You will arrive July 21 in a Kingdom of Thailand divided politically and focused inward, uncertain about the country's future after revered but ailing 81 year old King Bhumibol eventually passes. Despite a deep and broad alliance partnership that continues to deliver significant benefits quietly to both sides, the immediate priorities of the U.S. and Thailand overlap less than in years past; yours will be the first Secretary of State visit to Thailand in four years, since July 2005. The meetings with PM Abhisit in Bangkok and FM Kasit in Phuket offer an opportunity to thank the Thai for our productive alliance partnership, for Thai facilitation of shared military, law enforcement, and intelligence efforts, as well as groundbreaking health/research collaboration and long-standing refugee support, and to express our support for Thailand's democracy to meet its current challenges and emerge strengthened. Temporary Calm in a Troubled Kingdom ------------------------------------ 2. (C) The past year has been a turbulent one in Thailand. Court decisions forced two Prime Ministers from office, and twice the normal patterns of political life took a back seat to disruptive protests in the streets. The yellow-shirted People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) occupied Government House from August to December 2008, shutting down Bangkok's airports for eight days in late November, to protest governments affiliated with ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The red-shirted United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), followers of Thaksin, disrupted a regional Asian Summit and sparked riots in Bangkok in mid-April after Thaksin, now a fugitive abroad in the wake of an abuse of power conviction, called for a revolution to bring him home. While both yellow and red try to lay exclusive claim to the mantle of democracy, neither is truly democratic in intent or tactics. 3. (C) The current PM, Abhisit Vejjajiva, is a photogenic, eloquent 44-year old Oxford graduate who generally has progressive instincts and says the right things about basic freedoms, social inequities, policy towards Burma, and how to address the troubled deep south, afflicted by a grinding ethno-nationalist Muslim-Malay separatist insurgency. Whether Abhisit can deliver change is another matter. He is beset with a fractious coalition, with partners more interested in self-enrichment than good governance, as well as a resurgent post-2006 coup military not interested in political compromises in the deep south or reducing its profile, at least as long as uncertainty over a looming royal succession crisis remains to be resolved. 4. (C) While Thailand in 2009 has been more stable than in 2008, mid-April red riots aside, it is the calm in the eye of a storm. Few observers believe that the deep political and social divides can be bridged until after King Bhumibol passes and Thailand's tectonic plates shift. Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn neither commands the respect nor displays the charisma of his beloved father, who greatly expanded the prestige and influence of the monarchy during his 62 year reign. Some question whether Vajiralongkorn will be crowned King, as Bhumibol desires. Nearly everyone expects the monarchy to shrink and change in function after succession. How much will change is open to question, with many institutions, figures, and political forces positioning for influence, not only over redefining the institution of monarchy but, equally fundamentally, what it means to be Thai. It is a heady time for observers of the Thai scene, a frightening one for normal Thai. Engaging a long-term ally and friend strategically --------------------------------------------- ----- 5. (C) Both major parties in Thai politics -- the ruling Democrats and the opposition, Thaksin-affiliated Puea Thai 208273 5/22/2009 9:55 09BANGKOK1253 Embassy Bangkok UNCLASSIFIED VZCZCXYZ0003 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHBK #1253/01 1420955 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 220955Z MAY 09 FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7093 INFO RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE UNCLAS BANGKOK 001253 SIPDIS STATE FOR L/DL JUSTICE FOR OFL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KLIG, TH SUBJECT: CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AGAINST DEA EMPLOYEES 1. (SBU) Pursuant to reftel, this will advise that Embassy Bangkok has received notice of legal proceedings in Thailand naming as defendants the following three employees from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration: Special Agent Derek S. Odney; Special Agent Scott Seeley-Hacker; and Special Agent Robert Zachariasiewicz. Special Agents Odney and Seeley-Hacker are, and were at all relevant times, accredited to Post as A/T staff. Special Agent Zachariasiewicz is assigned to the DEA's Special Operations Division in Washington, D.C., and is not, and has never been, accredited to Post. 2. (SBU) The legal proceedings have been initiated by a criminal complaint filed by plaintiff Viktor Bout in Southern Bangkok Criminal Court, entitled Criminal Litigation Between Mr. Victor Analojevich Bout, Plaintiff, and Mr. Derek S. Odney, Defendant No. 1; Mr. Robert Zachariasiewicz, Defendant No. 2; and Mr. Scott Hacker, Defendant No. 3, Case No. 1050/2552. The Southern Bangkok Criminal Court is located at Rachini Road, Phra Nakorn, Bangkok. 3. (SBU) Bout's complaint alleges that the three DEA employees violated various provisions of Thai law in connection with the investigation and arrest of Bout on terrorism charges in Bangkok in March 2008. In particular, the complaint alleges that the DEA employees made false statements to the Thai authorities leading to his arrest; illegally installed recording devices in the hotel room where Bout was arrested; and forced Bout at gun point to surrender to the Thai authorities. 4. (SBU) The Embassy received notice of the legal proceedings directly from the Southern Bangkok Criminal Court via express mail on May 20, 2009, in three envelopes individually addressed to the three DEA employees. On May 19, the Embassy had also obtained a copy of the criminal complaint from a prosecutor from the Office of the Attorney General, who had been provided a copy by Bout's defense counsel during an extradition hearing that same day at the Thai Criminal Court. 5. (SBU) The mailing received from the Southern Bangkok Criminal Court on May 20 included the following: the criminal complaint and four attached exhibits; a notice of an optional "mediation session" scheduled to be held at the court's Dispute Mediation Center on June 30, 2009 at 1:30 p.m.; a summons to appear either personally or through a legal representative at a Preliminary Hearing on July 13, 2009 at 1:30 p.m.; and a List of Witnesses, which names Bout, his defense lawyer, an officer from the Royal Thai Police and a prosecutor from the Office of the Attorney General. The mediation notice states that the parties are "required to notify the Court of [their] mediation intention" by contacting staff of the Dispute Mediation Center by telephone or mail. These documents were in Thai and are in the process of being translated at Post. 6. (SBU) Bout is currently in custody at Bangkok Remand Prison in Bangkok for purposes of extradition to the U.S. to face trial for conspiring to sell weapons to the FARC for use in killing Americans in Colombia. The indictment pending against Bout in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York charges him with four terrorism offenses: conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals; conspiracy to kill U.S. officers or employees; conspiracy to acquire and use an anti-aircraft missile; and conspiracy to provide material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization. 7. (SBU) The Royal Thai Police initially arrested Bout at the Sofitel Hotel in Bangkok on March 6, 2008 on Thai terrorism charges. On April 9, 2008, the Thai authorities dropped the Thai charges in favor of the U.S. prosecution and detained Bout on a provisional arrest warrant issued by the Thai Criminal Court in the extradition case. The U.S. formally submitted its extradition request to the Thai authorities on May 6, 2008. 8. (SBU) The DEA and Royal Thai Police closely coordinated Bout's investigation and arrest. Any and all investigative activities performed by DEA agents in Thailand in this matter, including those of the three agents Bout has sued, were performed in concert with, and with the knowledge and approval of, the Royal Thai Police. 9. (SBU) Thailand's Office of the Attorney General is prosecuting the extradition case against Bout on behalf of the United States. In October 2008, the Thai prosecutors completed their presentation of its extradition case, which included testimony from DEA Special Agent Zachariasiewicz, a Royal Thai Police officer, and officials from the Foreign and Interior Ministries. Special Agent Zachariasiewicz's testimony, among other things, described the close cooperation between the DEA and Thai authorities in the investigation and arrest of Bout. In over a dozen extradition hearings since that time, Bout's lawyers have sought to present evidence supporting his defense that the U.S. prosecution is politically motivated and that the extradition request violates the Extradition Treaty and Thai law. 10. (SBU) At an extradition hearing on May 19, 2009, the Thai Criminal Court ordered closing statements in the extradition case against Bout to be filed no later than June 30, 2009, and announced that a verdict in the matter would be delivered on August 11, 2009. 11. (SBU) Department of Justice Attach Christopher P. Sonderby has been involved in the Bout investigation and extradition since its inception and is knowledgeable about the facts relating to the attempted service of the criminal complaint and the facts of the case. Mr. Sonderby's contact information is as follows: Christopher P. Sonderby 12. (SBU) Post will not take any action regarding these legal proceedings unless and until it receives instructions to do so. JOHN BANGKOK 00001662 002.2 OF 003 (For Thai) party -- are favorable towards the U.S.; in fact, there are no radical, non-middle of the road parties represented in the Thai parliament. On the domestic political front, you should emphasize our hope that all sides will work out differences within the democratic framework and without resort to violence, as well as our support for long-time friend Thailand to work through its current difficulties and emerge as a more participatory democracy. 6. (C) If there is one area of policy difference between Thai parties affecting U.S. interests, it may well be certain elements of foreign policy. PM Abhisit and FM Kasit have stated that Thailand's foreign policy should reflect that it is a democracy, rather than being reduced to mere commercial interests of cabinet members, as they claim pro-Thaksin governments did; Thailand's Burma policy has shifted noticeably since Abhisit/Kasit came to office last December. Both Abhisit and Kasit are eager to avoid transactional diplomacy and engage you strategically, building on your meeting with Kasit in Washington in April and commitment to reanimating our Strategic Dialogue. 7. (C) The North Korea challenge via implementation of UNSCR 1874 and Burma policy in the wake of UN SYG Ban's visit, Aung San Suu Kyi's trial, and recent fighting which led to the greatest cross-border refugee flows into Thailand in a decade are key foreign policy issues to raise with Abhisit and Kasit, particularly given Thailand's current role as ASEAN Chair. The rise of China, and the perceived absence of a focused U.S. presence in the region in recent years, is another strategic issue worth addressing; Thailand does not seek to choose between the U.S. and China, prefers to have good relations with both, and wishes the U.S. to be engaged in the region. 8. (C) There are several bilateral concerns worth raising. On refugees, Thailand continues to host more than 140,000 Burmese and facilitate resettlement of more than 17,000 refugees to the U.S. this year, for which we are grateful, but it has been much less helpful on a small group of Lao Hmong, which has drawn Congressional attention. Thai authorities facilitated the arrest of notorious Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout in March 2008; we await the results of the extradition hearing August 11. U.S. firms still receive preferred national treatment in a number of sectors, bolstering a strong trade and investment relationship, but Thai officials need to do more to strengthen the investment climate, particularly on Customs reform and intellectual property rights enforcement. Enduring value from the relationship ------------------------------------ 9. (C) Regional operational platform: The U.S. mission in Thailand is one of the largest and most diverse in the world - with over 2000 employees representing nearly 40 different departments and agencies - for good reason: we can accomplish a tremendous amount in Thailand, not only bilaterally but as a regional platform, often in ways that would be almost impossible to replicate elsewhere. That operational success occurs routinely, without fanfare or headlines, and perhaps is undervalued as a result; it would also be fair to say that we probably derive more from the relationship at present than the Thai do. More than half of the mission's employees work regionally, not bilaterally, and Bangkok's role as a regional operational, assistance, financial/IT support, and training hub for the USG will continue to expand in the coming years. 10. (SBU) Health/disease research: With approximately 400 Mission staff working on health issues, the Embassy hosts one of the USG's largest efforts to fight the world's most dangerous diseases: malaria; TB; dengue; HIV/AIDS; and pandemic influenza. CDC, USAID, USDA/APHIS, and the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences (AFRIMS) collaborate with Thai counterparts on basic research and trial vaccines, and are platforms for assistance throughout the region. The sophistication of the Thai scientific and BANGKOK 00001662 003.2 OF 003 public health community makes collaboration as useful to the USG as it is to the Thais. A number of important breakthroughs, such as in the prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission from mothers to children, were developed here, and several phase III, double blind trials for potential HIV vaccines are currently ongoing. 11. (C) Mil-Mil ties: As one of five U.S. treaty allies in Asia and straddling a major force projection air/sea corridor, Thailand is crucial to U.S. security interests well beyond Southeast Asia. Our bilateral military relationship provides distinctive force projection opportunities from Thai military facilities amid vital sea and air lanes that support combat and humanitarian assistance missions, the opportunity to conduct live fire training exercises, both bilateral and multilateral, that are impossible to match elsewhere in Asia. We access the Utapao Naval Air Field alone a 1000 times a year; had the North Korean ship Kang Nam 1 continued on to Burma rather than turning around, we would have staged P-3s to Utapao to track it. Preserving such unfettered, unquestioned access requires engagement and remains a mission and USG priority. 12. (SBU) Law enforcement: 40 years of law enforcement cooperation initially focused on counter-narcotics efforts has expanded to all aspects of transnational crime, defending U.S. interests and securing extraditions of both U.S. citizens and third country nationals, and building capacity in the Thai criminal justice system. Eighteen federal and local law enforcement agencies are currently represented in the Embassy. The U.S. and Thailand co-host the International Law Enforcement Academy, a regional platform to promote law enforcement professionalism. The extradition case of Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout, wanted in New York on charges of conspiring to provide arms to terrorists, is our current law enforcement top priority. JOHN